In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

libceph: validate OSD extent maps before cursor advance

net/ceph/osd client.c:osd sparse read() validates that the sparse-read data length matches the summed extent lengths, but it does not validate that each OSD-supplied extent is monotonic and lies inside the original request range. A malformed authenticated OSD reply can advertise a far-forward nonzero extent offset with a matching data length and make the client advance the message-data cursor beyond the request buffer. This reaches the BUG ON(!*length) assertion in ceph msg data next() from the client receive path.

Impact: A malicious or compromised authenticated Ceph OSD peer can crash a kernel Ceph client via a malformed sparse-read reply.

Reject sparse extent maps that overflow, move backwards, overlap, or extend outside the original sparse-read request before advancing the cursor.

[ idryomov: perform sparse extent map valid() check a bit earlier, in CEPH SPARSE READ DATA LEN instead of CEPH SPARSE READ DATA PRE state ]