CVE-2026-97910

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ASoC: sprd: validate compress buffer sizes against fixed allocations

sprd platform compr open() allocates the stage 0 IRAM buffer (32K data area) and the stage 1 DDR buffer (2M data area) with fixed sizes, but sprd platform compr copy() derives all copy lengths from the user controlled runtime->fragment size and the write() count, never comparing them against the physical buffer sizes. The compress core only checks fragment size * fragments for an u32 overflow in snd compress check input(), so a local user can configure a logical buffer of up to ~4GB via SNDRV COMPRESS SET PARAMS, far exceeding the fixed allocations.

A fragment size larger than the 32K IRAM data area makes the stage 0 copy from user() overflow past the IRAM allocation, and a buffer size larger than the 2M DDR buffer makes the wrapping copy at the end of sprd platform compr copy() write fully user controlled data past the buffer. No SNDRV PCM TRIGGER START is needed, a write() in SETUP state reaches the copy callback directly.

Reject parameters that do not fit into the fixed buffers in set params(), and fix the advertised max fragment size: 128K never fitted into the 32K IRAM buffer. The caps values may have been carried over from the qdsp6 driver, which allocates its buffers according to the advertised maxima, unlike this driver. With 32K as max fragment size the advertised limits are self-consistent: 32K * 64 = 2M equals the DDR buffer size.

Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.