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A Denial of Service (DoS) issue exists in the `request.form()` function when processing `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` requests. While limits for `max fields` and `max part size` are enforced for `multipart/form-data`, they are ignored for url-encoded bodies. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to cause resource exhaustion through two methods: sending a large number of fields (e.g., 1,000,000 fields), which blocks the worker's event loop and consumes CPU, or sending a single very large field, which forces unbounded memory allocation.

Request-line validation can be bypassed when a `DefaultHttpRequest` or `DefaultFullHttpRequest` is created and its URI is subsequently modified using the `setUri()` function. While constructors reject CRLF (Carriage Return Line Feed) and whitespace characters to prevent start-line corruption, `setUri()` does not perform this validation. Consequently, `HttpRequestEncoder` and `RtspEncoder` write the URI into the request line verbatim. If attacker-controlled input is passed to `setUri()`, it enables CRLF injection and the insertion of additional HTTP or RTSP requests. This can lead to HTTP request smuggling, desynchronization on the HTTP side, and request injection on the RTSP side.

NiceGUI’s `app.add media file()` and `app.add media files()` functions are susceptible to a flaw where a user-controlled query parameter, passed to the range-response implementation without validation, can bypass chunked streaming. This allows an attacker to force the server to load entire files into memory. With large media files and concurrent requests, this can lead to excessive memory consumption, degraded performance, or denial of service. The vulnerable functions are used for serving media content. The parameter is passed to the `range-response` implementation.