The Symfony Serializer component `ObjectNormalizer` incorrectly treats attribute names containing `.` (and `[` starting from version 6.4) as writable property paths. This allows untrusted input to modify properties of nested objects, bypassing the `#[Ignore]` metadata attribute. The issue occurs because `ObjectNormalizer::isAllowedAttribute()` accepts these names, and `setAttributeValue()` passes them to `PropertyAccessor::setValue()`, which parses the name as a path to traverse into nested objects. For example, a payload key like `customer.admin` can write to `$order->customer->admin`. Additionally, since `PropertyAccessor` resolves path segments against public methods, a segment matching a public method name can trigger that method with an attacker-supplied value. This affects applications binding untrusted input to objects, such as controllers using `#[MapRequestPayload]` or `#[MapQueryString]`. When using `OBJECT TO POPULATE` for partial updates, the traversal can reach a hydrated entity graph, potentially leading to the persistence of modified fields.