Alexwaira

Two endpoint families fail to verify that nested resource identifiers belong to the workspace and project specified in the URL. An authenticated user can read or modify estimates from another workspace via the PATCH '/api/workspaces/{slug}/projects/{project id}/estimates/{estimate id}/' endpoint, or inject comments into an issue from another workspace via the POST '/api/workspaces/{slug}/projects/{project id}/issues/{issue id}/comments/' endpoint. While the `ProjectEntityPermission` function verifies membership in the workspace and project from the URL, the `estimate id` and `issue id` variables are fetched by primary key without confirming the same scope.

Authenticated users with a Viewer role or higher can perform SQL injection by providing specially crafted telemetry field-key names. The application fails to properly escape these names in the 'v5 query range' API endpoint, allowing attackers to use backticks and quotes to break out of identifiers and string literals. This enables the execution of arbitrary ClickHouse SQL commands to access system tables and exfiltrate data.

DuckDB, Snowflake, BigQuery, and DeltaLake I/O managers construct SQL WHERE clauses by interpolating dynamic partition key values into queries without escaping. A user with the `Add Dynamic Partitions` permission can create a partition key that injects arbitrary SQL, which executes against the target database backend using the I/O manager's credentials. This issue only affects deployments using dynamic partitions; pipelines using static or time-window partitions are not impacted.

Portainer includes a security setting to disable bind mounts for non-administrators, intended to prevent regular users from binding host paths into containers via the Portainer-mediated Docker API. However, the enforcement mechanism only inspected the `HostConfig.Binds` array and ignored the equivalent `HostConfig.Mounts` array. Since both fields are interchangeable on the Docker daemon, an authenticated user with container-creation rights can bypass this restriction by submitting a `bind`-typed entry under `HostConfig.Mounts` at the 'POST /containers/create' endpoint. This allows the user to mount any host path into their container, potentially gaining read or write access to the host filesystem as the Docker daemon user (typically `root`). This can lead to the exposure of sensitive files, compromise of other containers on the same host, or full Docker API access if the Docker socket is mounted.