Alias Robotics

**Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions** actionlib (affected versions not specified) **Description** The issue is caused by an unsafe parsing of YAML values in the ROS core package of actionlib, allowing the instantiation of arbitrary objects. This occurs when an action message is processed to be sent, enabling the creation of Python objects. An attacker with local or remote access can exploit this flaw to execute arbitrary code in Python form on the ROS Master. **Recommendations** Consider using `yaml.safe load()` instead of the unsafe load method to prevent the instantiation of arbitrary objects. At the moment, there is no information about a newer version that contains a fix for this vulnerability.

**Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions** MiR100 (affected versions not specified) MiR200 (affected versions not specified) MiR250 (affected versions not specified) MiR500 (affected versions not specified) MiR1000 (affected versions not specified) **Description** The issue allows access to the Control Dashboard on a hardcoded IP address through wired and wireless interfaces within the MiR fleet. Default credentials for the wireless interface are well-known and widely spread, and this information is also available in past User Guides and manuals distributed by the vendor. This flaw enables cyber attackers to remotely take control of the robot and use the default user interfaces created by MiR, making attacks available to entry-level attackers. More elaborate attacks can be established by clearing authentication and sending network requests directly. **Recommendations** For MiR100, consider disabling the default user interfaces until a fix is available. For MiR200, restrict access to the Control Dashboard on the hardcoded IP address to minimize the risk of exploitation. For MiR250, MiR500, and MiR1000, if the flaw applies, avoid using the default credentials and consider implementing custom authentication mechanisms. At the moment, there is no information about a newer version that contains a fix for this vulnerability.

The access tokens for the REST API are directly derived (sha256 and base64 encoding) from the publicly available default credentials from the Control Dashboard (refer to CVE-2020-10270 for related flaws). This flaw in combination with CVE-2020-10273 allows any attacker connected to the robot networks (wired or wireless) to exfiltrate all stored data (e.g. indoor mapping images) and associated metadata from the robot's database.

**Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions** No specific software name or affected versions are mentioned in the provided descriptions. **Description** The issue concerns the generation of access tokens for a REST API, which are directly derived from publicly available default credentials for the web interface. Given a `USERNAME` and a `PASSWORD`, the token string is generated using base64(USERNAME:sha256(PASSWORD)). This allows an unauthorized attacker inside the network to compute the token and interact with the REST API, potentially leading to data exfiltration, infiltration, or deletion. **Recommendations** At the moment, there is no information about a newer version that contains a fix for this vulnerability.

**Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions** Kuka (affected versions not specified) **Description** A critical issue allows for the termination of essential services from the Windows Task Manager, which can halt the manipulator's operation. After such an event, a re-calibration of the brakes is required, which can only be performed by a Kuka technician or using Kuka-issued calibration hardware, leading to increased downtime and operational costs. **Recommendations** At the moment, there is no information about a newer version that contains a fix for this vulnerability.