At1As

The Backup Migration plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to OS Command Injection in all versions up to, and including, 2.1.5.1 due to insufficient sanitization of the `file` POST parameter on the `restoreBackup()` AJAX handler. The handler applies `esc attr()` — an HTML-context sanitizer that does not strip shell metacharacters — and concatenates the result, unquoted, into a `php-cli -f … bmi restore <file> <remote>` command passed to `exec()`. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Administrator-level access (or any user granted the plugin's `do backups` capability) and above, to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web-server user, bypassing WordPress hardening constants such as `DISALLOW FILE EDIT` and `DISALLOW FILE MODS` that would otherwise prevent code execution from the admin UI. This is an incomplete fix of CVE-2023-7002, which patched the same pattern only in the `$ POST['url']` path of `handleQuickMigration()`; the equivalent mitigations (`rawurlencode()` + explicit shell-metachar replacement + double-quoting in `exec()`) were never applied to `$backupName`.