Davidsclee

The Tapo Cloud MQTT broker contains a broken access control vulnerability in a proxy topic used by authenticated Tapo devices to request service tokens. The broker does not verify that the device ID supplied in a proxy request belongs to the authenticated device. An attacker who owns a Tapo device and knows another device's ID may obtain a device token scoped to the target device and use it to upload attacker-controlled content to the target user's Tapo Cloud storage. The content may then be presented in the Tapo app as a legitimate event. Successful exploitation may allow an attacker to upload attacker-controlled content that is presented to a target user as a legitimate Tapo event, retrieve internal service information through crafted proxy requests, or abuse Tapo Cloud outbound request capability in activity that could affect service availability.

The Tapo Cloud MQTT proxy contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability because it accepts a user-controlled host value without sufficient input validation. An attacker may exploit this vulnerability to cause the Tapo Cloud service to send requests to an attacker-controlled server. Successful exploitation may cause the Tapo Cloud service to send a request to an attacker-controlled server, exposing the internal information and causing potential Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS).

A heap-based buffer overflow occurs in the HTTP POST body parsing logic due to insufficient boundary validation and missing validation of remaining buffer capacity after dynamic allocation when handling externally supplied HTTP input. An attacker on the same network segment can trigger heap memory corruption by sending crafted payloads that cause write operations beyond the allocated buffer boundaries. Successful exploitation can lead to a Denial-of-Service (DoS) condition, causing the device process to crash or become unresponsive, or potentially enable remote code execution (RCE).