The camel-hazelcast component manages Hazelcast instances using a default configuration that lacks a Java deserialization filter. When Camel builds the Hazelcast Config without a user-supplied `HazelcastInstance`, `hazelcastConfigUri`, or referenced Config bean, objects received via the Hazelcast cluster protocol are deserialized using `ObjectInputStream.readObject()` before processing. An attacker capable of joining or reaching the Hazelcast cluster can send a crafted serialized Java object, leading to remote code execution on every Camel node. This issue affects any route using a hazelcast consumer (including hazelcast-topic, hazelcast-queue, hazelcast-seda, hazelcast-map, hazelcast-multimap, hazelcast-replicatedmap, hazelcast-list, and hazelcast-set), as well as the `HazelcastAggregationRepository` and `HazelcastIdempotentRepository`, when the managed instance uses the default configuration.