A path traversal issue exists in the Document API. The HTTP handler in internal/server/routes/docs.go uses the `cleanDocPath()` function to normalize user-supplied paths, but it fails to neutralize `../` traversal sequences. Subsequently, internal/storage/doc store.go constructs the target path using `filepath.Join()` without verifying that the resulting path remains within the intended documents directory. In default deployments where the Management API is unauthenticated and bound to all interfaces, a remote unauthenticated attacker can use traversal payloads via the `/api/docs` endpoint or the `/api/docs/...` path to read, create, overwrite, or delete arbitrary files with a `.md` extension on the host filesystem. Additionally, the `os.MkdirAll()` function can be used to create arbitrary directories. This may lead to the exposure of sensitive data, file corruption, or potential code execution through an arbitrary-write primitive. The vulnerable parameter is `path`.