Hugo Baraúna

A Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) issue exists when Livebook is configured to use Livebook Teams for identity. The `handle request/4` function in `lib/livebook/zta/livebook teams.ex` processes OAuth-style callbacks containing a `teams identity` marker and a `code` parameter. Because the `create auth request/1` function in `lib/livebook/teams/requests.ex` does not generate a state or nonce, the system fails to verify if the callback corresponds to the session that initiated the login. An attacker within the same Livebook Teams organization can initiate a login flow, capture the authorization code, and trick a victim into opening a URL containing that code. This causes the victim's session to be bound to the attacker's identity. Consequently, any work, secrets, or data produced by the victim are attributed to and accessible by the attacker, while the victim believes they are using their own account.

A failing open issue in livebook allows an unauthenticated network client to gain full access to a server that enforces identity through Livebook Teams. This occurs when a Livebook Agent or App Server caches a deployment group identifier that becomes unresolvable, such as when the group is deleted while the agent is disconnected. The function `handle call/3` in `lib/livebook/hubs/team client.ex` fails to distinguish between an unresolvable group and one where identity enforcement is disabled, leading the system to report enforcement as switched off. Consequently, the `authenticate/3` function in `lib/livebook/zta/livebook teams.ex` returns empty identity metadata, which `build current user/3` in `LivebookWeb.UserPlug` merges into a new user with default full access. This is then granted access by `authorized?/1` in `LivebookWeb.AuthPlug`. An attacker can exploit this to read notebooks and secrets, execute code on the server's runtime, and disrupt operations.