Jeroengui

Playwright Capture fails to sufficiently restrict navigations and resource requests initiated by rendered pages. An attacker-controlled page can abuse browser-side redirection mechanisms, such as `window.location.href`, to force the capture process to open 'file://' URLs or request resources from private, loopback, link-local, or non-public IP addresses. This can lead to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), where a remote attacker performs requests against internal services or accesses local files from the capture environment. Depending on the generated artifacts, responses from these resources may be leaked via screenshots, saved page content, or logs.

Portainer includes a security setting to disable bind mounts for non-administrators, intended to prevent regular users from binding host paths into containers via the Portainer-mediated Docker API. However, the enforcement mechanism only inspected the `HostConfig.Binds` array and ignored the equivalent `HostConfig.Mounts` array. Since both fields are interchangeable on the Docker daemon, an authenticated user with container-creation rights can bypass this restriction by submitting a `bind`-typed entry under `HostConfig.Mounts` at the 'POST /containers/create' endpoint. This allows the user to mount any host path into their container, potentially gaining read or write access to the host filesystem as the Docker daemon user (typically `root`). This can lead to the exposure of sensitive files, compromise of other containers on the same host, or full Docker API access if the Docker socket is mounted.