Kamil-Sawicki

#3731of 56,330
73.7Total CVSS
Vulnerabilities · 8
High
3
Critical
5
PT-2026-50584
8.5
2026-06-17
Gitea · Gitea · CVE-2026-24791
**Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions** Gitea versions prior to 1.26.2 **Description** Authenticated self routes under the `/api/v1/user/...` group do not properly enforce the `public-only` token restriction. This allows a token or OAuth grant marked as `public-only` to access or modify private account resources, provided it possesses the required read or write scopes. This is a systemic scope-boundary bypass affecting multiple endpoints, including: - `/api/v1/user`: Access to private profiles and settings. - `/api/v1/user/emails`: Management of account email addresses. - `/api/v1/user/keys`: Management of SSH public keys. - `/api/v1/user/applications/oauth2`: Creation and listing of OAuth2 applications, including exposure of `client secret`. - `/api/v1/user/actions/secrets/{secretname}`: Management of user-level Actions secrets. - `/api/v1/user/actions/variables`: Management of user-level Actions variables. - `/api/v1/user/actions/runners/...`: Management of runners and minting of registration tokens. - `/api/v1/user/repos`: Creation and listing of private repositories. - `/api/v1/user/actions/runs` and `/api/v1/user/actions/jobs`: Access to private repository workflow metadata. - `/api/v1/user/subscriptions`, `/api/v1/user/times`, `/api/v1/user/stopwatches`, `/api/v1/user/teams`, and `/api/v1/user/hooks`: Access to private account resources. **Recommendations** Update Gitea to version 1.26.2 or later. As a temporary mitigation, restrict the issuance of tokens with `write:user` or `write:repository` scopes to only trusted entities to minimize the risk of unauthorized private resource modification.
PT-2026-50163
10
2026-06-16
Traefik · Traefik · CVE-2026-53622
**Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions** Traefik versions 3.6.17 through 3.7.1 **Description** An issue in the HTTP/3 (QUIC) TLS configuration selection allows unauthenticated clients to bypass router-specific mutual TLS (mTLS) enforcement. When HTTP/3 is enabled, the TLS handshake uses an exact, case-sensitive lookup on the Server Name Indication (SNI) value to select the TLS configuration. This process fails to match wildcard host patterns (e.g., `*.example.com`) or case variants of the configured hostname. Consequently, the handshake falls back to the default TLS configuration, which may not require client certificates. However, the subsequent HTTP routing layer still matches the request to a backend protected by an mTLS policy, allowing the request to proceed without authentication. Technical details include: - **Vulnerable Function**: `GetTLSGetClientInfo()` performs the flawed map lookup. - **Vulnerable Parameters**: The `info.ServerName` variable is used for the case-sensitive lookup. **Recommendations** Update to version 3.7.3 or later. As a temporary workaround, disable HTTP/3 on entrypoints that rely on router-specific mTLS. As a temporary workaround, enforce mTLS in the default TLS options to ensure the fallback configuration is not weaker than router-specific settings. As a temporary workaround, block UDP access to the HTTP/3 entrypoint. As a temporary workaround, enforce client authentication at an additional layer behind the software.