Karol Mazurkowi

The issue is related to incorrect file permissions in DaVinci Resolve on MacOS, which can lead to Dylib Hijacking. This inconsistency with standard macOS security practices allows for privilege escalation, where the guest account, other users, and applications can exploit this issue.

The issue allows an attacker with access to the Administration panel, specifically the "Role Management" tab, to inject code by adding a new role in the `name` field. However, the risk of exploiting this issue is reduced due to the required additional error that allows bypassing the Content-Security-Policy policy, which mitigates JS code execution while still allowing HTML injection.

The issue allows IP address spoofing by providing a custom value in the `X-Forwarded-For` header, which compromises the action logging mechanism's accountability.

The issue concerns code injection in the "modalDlgMsgInternal" parameter via POST in the "/EPMUI/ModalDlgHandler.ashx?value=showReadonlyDlg" endpoint, which is then executed in the browser. The risk of exploitation is somewhat mitigated by the need to bypass the Content-Security-Policy.

The application does not limit the number or frequency of user interactions, such as the number of incoming requests. At the "/EPMUI/VfManager.asmx/ChangePassword" endpoint, it is possible to perform a brute force attack on the current password in use.

The issue allows for HTML code injection into the page content through the `content` field in the Application definition page. The estimated number of potentially affected devices worldwide is not available. There is no information about real-world incidents where this issue was exploited.