Several Avro decoder paths read attacker-controlled 64-bit values from the wire format and either narrowed them to platform-sized `int` before bounds-checking or summed them using overflow-prone signed-int arithmetic. On 32-bit targets, these truncation paths can bypass byte-slice limits, select the wrong union branch, or cause a panic during OCF block reads. Additionally, three issues affect all platforms: cumulative-size arithmetic overflow in `arrayDecoder.Decode()`, `mapDecoder.Decode()`, and `mapDecoderUnmarshaler.Decode()` (which can bypass `MaxSliceAllocSize` and `MaxMapAllocSize`), `math.MinInt` negation in block-header handling, and negative size allocation in `make([]byte, size)` during OCF block reads. These flaws provide an attacker with a denial-of-service primitive via an untrusted Avro stream.