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In multi-tenant deployments using WebAuthn with a shared user pool, the server fails to constrain lookups to the requested tenant and does not verify tenant membership during sign-in. This allows a user with a valid passkey in one tenant to authenticate into another tenant within the same application, even without membership in the target tenant. The issue involves the `loadOptionsById Transaction()` and `getUserInfoByCredentialId Transaction()` functions, as well as the `WebAuthN.signIn` method.

A race condition exists where the `createNewSession()` function can resolve a primary user before the `unlinkAccounts()` function detaches a login method. The session is then inserted after the unlink process has already enumerated and revoked existing sessions. An attacker controlling the linked login method can exploit this to maintain a signed, database-backed, and refreshable session as the former primary identity after the method is unlinked. This session remains active until it expires or is explicitly revoked.

An authorization flaw exists in the `checkPermissionsForCreateOrUpdate()` function within the `Multitenancy` class. In licensed multi-tenant deployments where multiple applications share a non-default connection URI domain and use separate `api keys`, an attacker with a valid API key for one application can update the parent connection URI domain. This occurs because the system fails to require the source application and tenant to be public when checking the domain during create or update operations. Consequently, an attacker can replace the parent key and sibling application keys, modify sibling users, hijack sessions, and establish persistence via sibling dashboard users. Additionally, omitting the optional identifier in v2 create or update handlers allows an attacker to target the base tenant, bypassing permission checks and enterprise-feature gates to modify `firstFactors`, required secondary factors, and recipe-enabled flags, which compromises login integrity and availability.

An issue exists in the HTTP/1.1 parser that allows the processing of requests containing both `Content-Length` and `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` headers. This can be exploited by unauthenticated remote attackers using a front-end intermediary to desynchronize backend requests, enabling the smuggling of malicious HTTP requests to the Actix service. HTTP request smuggling is a technique used to interfere with the way a website processes sequences of HTTP requests.

The software does not properly validate file target paths for Advanced Logging. This allows system administrators to potentially read arbitrary host files through a malicious AdvancedLoggingJSON configuration when generating support packets.

A flaw in the permission model allows Unix Domain Socket (UDS) connections to bypass network restrictions when `--permission` is enabled. Even without `--allow-net`, attacker-controlled inputs, such as URLs or socketPath options, can connect to arbitrary local sockets via net, tls, or undici/fetch. This breaks the intended security boundary of the permission model and enables access to privileged local services, potentially leading to privilege escalation, data exposure, or local code execution. The network permissions (`--allow-net`) are currently in the experimental phase.

The multi-session plugin contains a flaw in the `/sign-out` endpoint after-hook. The system trusts raw multi-session cookies and forwards extracted values to the `deleteSessions()` function within the `internalAdapter` without verifying the cookie signature, such as by using `getSignedCookie()`. This allows an attacker to provide a forged ` multi-*` cookie to trigger the deletion of arbitrary session tokens.

The @hoppscotch/cli is a CLI to run Hoppscotch Test Scripts in CI environments. Prior to version 0.8.0, the @hoppscotch/js-sandbox package provides a Javascript sandbox that uses the Node.js vm module. However, the vm module is not safe for sandboxing untrusted Javascript code, as code inside the vm context can break out if it can get a hold of any reference to an object created outside of the vm. In the case of @hoppscotch/js-sandbox, multiple references to external objects are passed into the vm context to allow pre-request scripts interactions with environment variables and more. But this also allows the pre-request script to escape the sandbox.