Paul Alkemade

**Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions** Now Platform (affected versions not specified) **Description** A sandbox escape issue exists in the Now Platform. This flaw allows an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code, which could result in unauthorized access to the platform beyond intended permissions. A sandbox is a security mechanism for separating running programs from the rest of the system to prevent malicious code from affecting the host. **Recommendations** Apply the security updates provided by ServiceNow or upgrade to a patched release.

**Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions** Velociraptor versions prior to 0.6.7-5 **Description** The issue allows a low privilege user to overwrite files on the server, including Velociraptor configuration files, due to the VQL `copy()` function not checking for permission to write files. To exploit this, an attacker must have a Velociraptor user account at a low privilege level and be able to log into the GUI and create a notebook where they can run the VQL query invoking the `copy()` VQL function. **Recommendations** For Velociraptor versions prior to 0.6.7-5, update to version 0.6.7-5 or later to resolve the issue. As a temporary workaround, consider restricting access to the `copy()` function for low privilege users until a patch is applied. Additionally, limit the ability of low privilege users to create notebooks and run VQL queries that invoke the `copy()` function.

**Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions** Rapid7 Velociraptor versions prior to 0.6.7-5 **Description** The issue allows a directory traversal where the collection task could be written by not properly sanitizing the client ID parameter to the "CreateCollection API". This could be exploited by providing a client ID of "../clients/server" to schedule the collection for the server, requiring only privileges to schedule collections on the client. Normally, scheduling an artifact on the server requires the "COLLECT SERVER" permission, which is typically granted to the "administrator" role. However, due to this issue, having the "COLLECT CLIENT" privilege, normally granted to the "investigator" role, is sufficient. To exploit this, an attacker must have a Velociraptor user account at least at the "investigator" level and be able to authenticate to the GUI and issue an API call to the backend. **Recommendations** For versions prior to 0.6.7-5, update to version 0.6.7-5 or later to fix the issue. As a temporary workaround, consider restricting access to the "CreateCollection API" or limiting the privileges of the "investigator" role until the update can be applied. Additionally, restrict the use of the `client ID` parameter to prevent directory traversal attacks.