R0Binak

An unauthenticated information disclosure issue exists where the operator exposes all vulnerability scan reports. The '/report/' HTTP endpoint utilizes a raw http.FileServer over the reports directory (default `/reports`) without authentication, authorization, or middleware. This allows any client with access to the operator's HTTP port (default 8080) to list and download JSON vulnerability reports, revealing affected package names, versions, and container image identifiers for all scanned workloads in the cluster.

An unchecked type assertion in the variable-substitution engine allows users capable of submitting resources to crash the policy engine. By submitting resources containing non-string fields referenced by `{{- variable }}` shallow substitution in policies, an attacker can trigger a panic. This results in a webhook denial of service and can lead to a policy bypass when the `failurePolicy` is set to Ignore.

An unchecked type assertion in the `buildStatementMap()` function allows unauthenticated attackers to crash the policy engine by providing crafted attestation statements. By pushing an OCI referrer manifest containing a non-string type field, an attacker can cause the reports-controller to enter a crash-loop or bypass image verification when the `failurePolicy` is set to Ignore.

The PropertyCard.vue component uses the Vue 3 `v-html` directive, which injects raw HTML and disables auto-escaping. The `isURL()` function only filters values that parse as http: or https: URLs, allowing any HTML payload not starting with those schemes to bypass the guard and flow directly into the DOM. The affected data originates from Kubernetes PolicyReport `.results[].properties` fields, which are arbitrary string maps that can be populated by policy engines or any principal with write access to PolicyReport objects in the cluster.

A flaw exists in the policy exception handling when a policy is set to enforce mode and combined with two PolicyExceptions. The system incorrectly allows a less restrictive exception to take precedence over a stricter one. An attacker can bypass policy enforcement, such as restrictions on hostPath volumes, by crafting a resource name that matches the broader exception pattern (e.g., `*ingress*`).

Server-side request forgery (SSRF) exists within the Service Call functionality. An attacker with permissions to create Kyverno (Cluster)Policies can specify an external URL in the `apiCall/service` configuration. While the Service Call is intended for in-cluster services, it also resolves external addresses, enabling requests to be sent to an attacker-controlled server. This allows for the exfiltration of sensitive cluster data, including the contents of Kubernetes resources such as secrets, which are included in the policy context data sent during these requests.