Snipe

Snipe-IT's predefined kit checkout path does not enforce Full Multiple Company Support (FMCS) tenant isolation on the checkout target. Unlike the single, bulk, API, accessory, license and consumable checkout paths, AppServicesPredefinedKitCheckoutService never calls $item->canCheckoutTo($target); it only performs the actor-vs-item policy check and an availability check before persisting the checkout. With FMCS enabled, a non-superuser who belongs to at least two companies and holds the assets.checkout permission can POST to /kits/{kit}/checkout with a user id belonging only to company B and have a company-A asset (and likewise kit licenses, consumables and accessories) assigned to that user, bypassing the company-mismatch check that blocks the same operation on every other checkout path. The issue is fixed in Snipe-IT 8.7.2; it was runtime-verified on v8.6.3 and code-inspected on v8.7.1, and the affected service has lacked the check since 2019, so earlier FMCS deployments are likely also affected.

Snipe-IT versions before 8.7.0 fail to sanitize the category EULA text field before rendering it in checkout confirmation emails. Attackers with low-privilege permissions can inject markdown image syntax or raw HTML img tags pointing to local files or remote URLs, which the mail auto-embed library resolves server-side and returns as email attachments, exfiltrating sensitive files like .env credentials and enabling SSRF attacks.

Snipe-IT through 8.6.3 does not neutralize formula elements in the "unaccepted assets" acceptance report CSV export. ReportsController::postAssetAcceptanceReport builds the CSV by hand (stripping commas and joining rows manually) and, unlike the six sibling exports in the same controller, never applies LeagueCsvEscapeFormula or honors the config('app.escape formulas') setting. An authenticated low-privilege user with ordinary create/edit rights on any record whose free-text fields appear in the report (asset name/tag, company name, category, model, or assignee display name) can set such a field to a value beginning with =, +, -, @, tab, or CR. When a user with reports.view privileges requests the export (POST /reports/unaccepted assets) for a pending checkout acceptance referencing the poisoned record and opens the resulting CSV in Excel, LibreOffice Calc, or Google Sheets, the injected content is evaluated as a formula in the downloader's spreadsheet context, enabling data exfiltration (e.g., HYPERLINK/WEBSERVICE) or, on legacy Windows Excel configurations, DDE command execution. Fixed in 8.7.0.

Snipe-IT versions before 8.7.0 fail to properly scope asset acceptance report queries by company, allowing authenticated reports.view users to read pending acceptances across all companies. Attackers can access the unaccepted assets report page or CSV export to disclose cross-company inventory details and assignee names without per-row access validation.

Snipe-IT 8.6.3 and earlier (and develop pre-release commits prior to the fix) contain a race condition in the asset checkout paths. ApiAssetsController::checkout() and AssetsAssetCheckoutController::store() call Asset::availableForCheckout() outside the mutation path and then invoke Asset::checkOut() without taking a row lock or re-checking availability, so two concurrent checkout requests for the same available asset can both observe it as available and both commit. This produces duplicate checkout-history rows, a doubled checkout counter, and two CheckoutableCheckedOut events for a single-assignment asset, corrupting the audit trail and utilization/reconciliation reporting; the asset's final assigned to remains singular, so the visible assignment stays intact. Exploitation requires an authenticated session holding the assets.checkout permission (or superuser) and precise concurrent timing. Fixed in 8.7.0.

Snipe-IT is an IT asset management application. In Snipe-IT master-branch builds after 8.6.3 (the code was never included in a tagged release), SettingsController::downloadLocationScopingReport streams the FMCS location-scoping mismatch report (GET /admin/settings/location-scoping-report.csv) through a bare fputcsv() call without applying LeagueCsvEscapeFormula, unlike the other CSV exports which honor config('app.escape formulas'). An authenticated user with ordinary create/edit rights can place a spreadsheet formula in free-text fields that appear in the report (item name, asset tag, serial, item or location company name, location name) and arrange for the record to be FMCS-mismatched so it is included in the export. When a superuser downloads the report and opens it in Excel, LibreOffice Calc, or Google Sheets with formula evaluation enabled and external-content warnings dismissed or disabled, cells beginning with =, +, -, @, tab, or CR are executed in the victim's spreadsheet context, enabling data exfiltration (e.g., HYPERLINK/WEBSERVICE) or, on Windows Excel, legacy DDE command execution. This issue is fixed in version 8.7.0.

Snipe-IT before 8.7.0 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in Livewire components that enforce authorization only at the route level, not within component lifecycle methods. Attackers with a valid authenticated session can replay signed component snapshots via POST /livewire/update to invoke protected methods and escalate privileges, including creating OAuth clients, minting personal access tokens, and accessing sensitive admin data.

Snipe-IT is an open source IT asset management system. In versions up to and including 8.6.3, the report acceptance endpoints POST /reports/unaccepted assets/sent reminder (ReportsController::sentAssetAcceptanceReminder) and DELETE /reports/unaccepted assets/{acceptanceId}/delete (ReportsController::deleteAssetAcceptance) are not correctly scoped when Full Multiple Company Support (FMCS) is enabled. In 8.6.3 the guard ReportsController::currentUserCanAccessAcceptance() early-exits with 'return true' when '! $user->company id' is truthy, which is the case for every pivot-only user (a user associated with companies through the company user pivot table whose scalar users.company id column is NULL); versions prior to 8.6.3 lacked the guard altogether. As a result, an authenticated user holding the reports.view permission can send acceptance-reminder emails for, and permanently delete, any pending acceptance record in the install regardless of which company owns the underlying checkoutable. Deletion is destructive and forfeits the acceptance audit trail for the affected item, and the reminder email exposes limited cross-company acceptance context (item name and assignment metadata) to the recipient. Acceptance IDs are sequential integers and can be enumerated. This issue is fixed in version 8.7.0.

Snipe-IT versions before 8.7.0 wipe the database before validating the uploaded backup archive in the restore endpoint. Superusers uploading corrupted or invalid zip files trigger permanent data loss with no recovery path or rollback mechanism.

Snipe-IT versions <= 8.6.3 (fixed in 8.7.0) do not check the return value of storage write operations in ImageUploadRequest::handleImages(). Because Laravel's default disk mode does not throw on failure, a silently failed Storage::disk('public')->put(...) call still caused the application to delete the previous image via deleteExistingImage() and to reassign and persist the model's image reference to the new filename, destroying the existing image and leaving the database row pointing at a file that was never written. A mirror problem existed in deleteExistingImage(), where a failed Storage::delete() still nulled the model's image field, orphaning the file on disk. The condition is not directly attacker-controlled: it is triggered when any legitimate authenticated user submits an image upload while the storage backend transiently fails (for example an S3 network error, a local filesystem permission problem, or quota exhaustion). The result is unrecoverable loss of the prior image and a durable inconsistency between the database and disk that requires manual reconciliation. All models whose controllers route through ImageUploadRequest::handleImages (assets, asset models, users, companies, manufacturers, locations, categories, suppliers, departments, and other image-carrying models) are affected.

Snipe-IT versions <= 8.6.3 (fixed in 8.7.0) do not validate company assignment authorization before persisting user records via the REST API. In ApiUsersController::store() and ::update(), the user record is filled from the request and saved before the requested company id / company ids[] values are filtered against the actor's permitted companies (Company::getIdsForCurrentUser()). On installs using Full Multiple Companies Support (FMCS), a non-superuser holding users.create (or users.edit on a target user) can submit company identifiers for companies outside their scope — including a mix of permitted and foreign ids — causing the account row to be committed to the database before authorization is checked. Where null company is floater=1 is set, the post-hoc filter leaves an empty company pivot and the account is persisted as a "floater" with cross-company visibility, allowing creation or relocation of user accounts across tenant boundaries.

snipe-it versions before 8.7.0 fail to enforce per-instance FMCS scoping in asset audit endpoints, relying solely on query-layer filtering instead of policy-layer authorization checks. Attackers with valid sessions and assets.audit permissions could write audit log entries against cross-company assets if the query-layer scope were bypassed or refactored.

Snipe-IT 8.5.0 through 8.6.3 contains an open redirect vulnerability in its SAML assertion-consumer endpoint (SamlController::acs, POST /saml/acs). The endpoint wrote the RelayState POST parameter directly into Laravel's url.intended session key with only CR/LF characters stripped, and LoginController later issued redirect()->intended(), which passes an absolute URL through to the Location header unchanged. An unauthenticated attacker who induces a user of a SAML-SSO-enabled instance to visit a crafted IdP-initiated SSO link can therefore cause the victim's browser to be redirected to an arbitrary absolute external URL immediately after a successful authentication, which the advisory notes facilitates credential-harvesting phishing. No account on the target instance and no compromise of the identity provider are required. Only deployments with SAML SSO enabled are affected. Fixed in 8.7.0 (commit d30b73d, PR #19386), which validates RelayState via a new Helper::sameOriginUrl check before storing it.

Snipe-IT 8.6.3 and earlier do not check the return value of Storage::put() when writing the signature PNG and the generated acceptance PDF in AccountAcceptanceController::store(). On filesystem drivers that return false instead of throwing on a write failure (for example the local disk with restrictive permissions, S3 with expired credentials, or a storage backend that is out of quota), execution continues into $acceptance->accept(), which sets accepted at and the signature filename/eula filename fields, creates the 'accepted' action-log entry, and dispatches completion notifications even though the evidence files were never stored. The result is an acceptance record marked complete whose supporting evidence files do not exist, yielding a materially incomplete compliance artifact for EULA acknowledgement or equipment-receipt workflows. The condition is triggered when an authenticated user completes an acceptance while the storage backend is silently failing writes; an attacker cannot directly force the storage backend into that state. Fixed in Snipe-IT 8.7.0.

Snipe-IT before 8.7.0 fails to check the return value of Storage::delete() in UploadedFilesController::destroy() and ApiUploadedFilesController::destroy(), allowing deletion requests to report success while files remain on disk. Administrators performing attachment deletions receive success responses and see files hidden from listings, but the physical files persist on disk and remain accessible to anyone with filesystem or backup access.

snipe-it versions before 8.7.0 fail to enforce asset view authorization in the GET /hardware/{asset}/barcode endpoint. Authenticated attackers can iterate asset IDs to retrieve barcodes and enumerate asset tags across tenants, including soft-deleted and cross-company assets.

snipe-it versions before 8.7.0 contain a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the ExternalUrl validation rule that fails to detect IPv6 transition addresses encoding private IPv4 targets. Attackers with super-admin privileges can configure webhook URLs using NAT64, 6to4, or Teredo transition addresses to bypass SSRF guards and access internal services or cloud metadata endpoints.

snipe-it before 8.7.0 contains an incorrect calculation vulnerability in checkout request handling that allows authenticated users to corrupt the assets.requests counter through duplicate submissions and cancellations without active requests. Attackers can repeatedly call cancel endpoints without active requests to drive the counter negative, or submit duplicate checkout requests to inflate the counter, misrepresenting pending demand in the admin queue.

Snipe-IT versions before 8.7.0 contain a CSS injection vulnerability in the Custom CSS field due to incomplete sanitization that reverses HTML encoding on greater-than and double-quote characters. Superusers can plant malicious CSS payloads using @import and url() references to exfiltrate CSRF tokens from other superusers via attribute-selector rules, enabling account takeover.

Snipe-IT before 8.7.1 fails to validate the length of the note field in the POST /account/accept/{acceptance} endpoint, allowing authenticated users to submit unbounded input that reaches synchronous CommonMark rendering. Attackers can submit large note values to exhaust PHP worker CPU and cause denial of service through resource exhaustion in the markdown parsing pipeline.