An authentication bypass exists in the language-per-domain Single Sign-On (SSO) handler. The issue occurs within the `process iframe request()` function during the logout process. When a user logs out, the system generates a cross-domain sign-in token using `wp create nonce('wpml sso')` on the logout landing page. Because authentication cookies are discarded at this stage, `wp get session token()` returns an empty string, causing the token to become a shared anonymous nonce instead of a user-bound secret. This token is then stored in a transient mapped to the victim's `user id` without binding to the specific sign-out action.
An unauthenticated attacker can derive the same token by triggering the logout confirmation flow on the `wp-login.php?action=logout` endpoint. By submitting a forged `wpml sso token domain` parameter with a `wpml user signed in` status to a secondary language-domain endpoint within the 60-second `SSO TIMEOUT` window, the attacker can trick the system into issuing authentication cookies for the victim. This allows attackers to gain unauthorized access to accounts, including those of administrators, while the user is logging out.