Key Exchange without Entity Authentication vulnerability in Erlang/OTP ssl allows a peer that answers a TLS 1.3 client connection to impersonate the intended server. A pre shared key extension in the ServerHello that the client never offered causes the client to complete the handshake without validating the server's certificate, so ssl:connect returns {ok, Socket} against a peer holding no certificate, no private key and no prior session.

tls client connection 1 3:handle server hello/2 passes the received extension to tls gen connection 1 3:handle resumption/2, which sets resumption = true on its mere presence without checking that the client offered a PSK. tls handshake 1 3:get pre shared key/4 meanwhile falls back to the all-zero "no PSK" value and keys the handshake with the ordinary non-PSK schedule, so the attacker's own ephemeral key suffices. The resumption flag then routes maybe resumption/1 straight to wait finished, skipping the certificate-handling states, so certificate path validation, verify fun, hostname verification, partial chain, CRL checking and OCSP stapling are all bypassed. The default client configuration is affected; clients restricted to TLS 1.2 are not.

This issue affects OTP from OTP 22.2 before OTP 27.3.4.18, OTP 28.5.0.7, and OTP 29.1.1, corresponding to ssl from 9.5 before 11.2.12.13, 11.6.0.6, and 11.7.7.