PT-2026-105188 · Bitnami · Rabbitmq
Published
2026-10-01
·
Updated
2026-10-01
None
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RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 4.2.7 and 4.3.1, pattern to regex maps % -> .? and -> ., then compiles ^...$ with only [unicode]; re:run is called with only [{capture, none}] - no explicit match limit. A pattern like % % ... %X becomes ^.?..?.....?.X$ with overlapping lazy quantifiers. The whole-expression cap is ?MAX EXPRESSION LENGTH=4096 chars / ?MAX TOKENS=200; a LIKE string literal is one token, so ~2000 % pairs fit. SQL filters are accepted unconditionally at rabbit amqp session.erl:3264 (no feature flag). Evaluated per-message at rabbit stream queue.erl:1439. OTP's default 10M match limit caps each match at ~100-200 ms (not seconds), and the re NIF yields to the scheduler. An authenticated AMQP 1.0 consumer with read+write on a stream queue can cause ~100-200 ms of CPU per delivered message via a crafted LIKE filter, multiplied across thousands of messages and parallel sessions - a substantial backtracking-driven CPU amplification. Preconditions include AMQP 1.0 with stream queues in use Attacker can attach a receiver with a filter (read permission) and publish messages with long property values (write permission). This issue is fixed in versions 4.2.7 and 4.3.1.
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Related Identifiers
Affected Products
Rabbitmq