PT-2026-105850 · Pypi · Mcp-Attlasian

Published

2026-10-01

·

Updated

2026-10-01

CVSS v4.0

8.3

High

VectorAV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N

sooperset/mcp-atlassian: HTTP upload tools can attach arbitrary server-local files

Date: 2026-05-05 Target: sooperset/mcp-atlassian Commit: d8bc78698a63cb6b321c7ca796d6329d448f7f6d

Summary

mcp-atlassian supports HTTP/SSE deployment for persistent, remote, and multi-user use. In that mode, write-capable Jira and Confluence attachment flows accept caller-controlled server-local file paths and read those paths without an upload-source allowlist or base directory restriction.
An authenticated caller, or a prompt-injected agent with tool-call capability, can cause the MCP server process to read a local file it can access and attach that file into a Jira issue or Confluence page using configured Atlassian credentials.
This is distinct from the prior download-path advisory: that issue was an arbitrary file write sink. This path is upload-source local file disclosure.

Impact

Impact is local file disclosure through an authenticated Atlassian attachment write. In Docker/Kubernetes deployments that mount .env or token material into the service, exposed files may include API tokens, OAuth credentials, service configuration, or other local secrets readable by the MCP process.
The issue is bounded by tool access and Atlassian permissions: the attacker needs an MCP call path to a write tool and an issue/page where the attachment can be written. It is not direct RCE.
Severity is Medium-to-High depending on deployment:
  • Medium for single-user/local stdio usage or tightly scoped tokens.
  • High where HTTP/streamable deployments are shared, write tools are exposed, and the server has access to secrets or broad filesystem mounts.

Source Evidence

HTTP/multi-user deployment is first-class:
  • docs/http-transport.mdx:1-7 describes running as a persistent HTTP service for multi-user and remote deployment.
  • docs/http-transport.mdx:10-13 lists SSE and streamable-http endpoints.
  • docs/http-transport.mdx:88-90 says both HTTP transports support per-request authentication.
  • docs/advanced/docker-production.mdx:25-37 shows Docker deployment with .env, exposed ports, and HOST=0.0.0.0.
  • docs/advanced/docker-production.mdx:91-103 shows Atlassian credentials stored in .env.
  • src/mcp atlassian/ init .py:359-363 defaults HTTP host to 0.0.0.0 unless overridden.
The Confluence upload path reads caller-chosen server-local files:
  • src/mcp atlassian/servers/confluence.py:1290-1315 exposes file path and explicitly accepts absolute or relative paths.
  • src/mcp atlassian/servers/confluence.py:1356-1363 passes file path to confluence fetcher.upload attachment.
  • src/mcp atlassian/confluence/attachments.py:62-70 only converts relative paths to absolute and checks existence.
  • src/mcp atlassian/confluence/attachments.py:77-80 passes the path to upload attachment direct.
  • src/mcp atlassian/confluence/attachments.py:477 opens file path for the multipart upload.
The Jira update path can also upload caller-chosen server-local files:
  • src/mcp atlassian/servers/jira.py:1564-1568 exposes jira update issue as a write tool in toolset:jira issues.
  • src/mcp atlassian/servers/jira.py:1609-1618 accepts attachments as a JSON array or comma-separated list of file paths.
  • src/mcp atlassian/servers/jira.py:1648-1674 parses those file paths and adds them to the update payload.
  • src/mcp atlassian/jira/issues.py:1132-1137 forwards attachments to upload attachments.
  • src/mcp atlassian/jira/attachments.py:372-389 converts relative paths to absolute, checks existence, opens the path, and passes it to jira.add attachment.
Existing controls do not authorize the upload source path:
  • src/mcp atlassian/utils/decorators.py:45-72 blocks writes only when read-only mode is enabled.
  • src/mcp atlassian/servers/main.py:276-279 filters write tools out of listing only in read-only mode.
  • src/mcp atlassian/utils/toolsets.py:158-183 currently enables all toolsets when TOOLSETS is unset.
  • docs/advanced/docker-production.mdx:109-119 documents READ ONLY MODE=true as an optional production hardening setting, not a default.
  • src/mcp atlassian/confluence/attachments.py:217-223 and src/mcp atlassian/jira/attachments.py:37-43 show validate safe path exists for download destinations, but no equivalent upload-source containment is applied.

Root cause

The codebase already has a path-containment primitive (validate safe path) and applies it to download destinations to prevent writes outside a configured base directory — that is, it correctly defends the filesystem-write side of the boundary. But the upload-source side of the same boundary is not defended at all: the Confluence and Jira attachment paths convert caller-supplied paths to absolute, check that the file exists, open it, and stream the bytes to Atlassian, with no equivalent "must resolve inside an upload base directory" check. The authorization model implicitly treats "the MCP process can read this file" as equivalent to "the MCP caller is authorized to upload this file," which is correct only for single-user stdio mode. For HTTP/SSE multi-user mode (which the project documents as first-class and ships with HOST=0.0.0.0), it is not — caller identity and process filesystem-read capability are different boundaries. The structural fix is to apply the existing validate safe path containment primitive to upload-source paths under a separate UPLOAD BASE DIR configuration, and to disable server-local upload tools by default in HTTP transport mode unless that base directory is configured.

Auth boundary violated

Boundary: Per-user resource ownership (in HTTP/SSE multi-user mode, an authenticated MCP caller's tool surface should expose only files the caller is authorized to upload — not arbitrary files in the MCP process's filesystem view, including operator-mounted secrets and other tenants' data).
Respected at: src/mcp atlassian/confluence/attachments.py:217-223 and src/mcp atlassian/jira/attachments.py:37-43 (validate safe path is correctly applied to download-destination paths to prevent writes outside a base directory).
Violated at: src/mcp atlassian/confluence/attachments.py:62-70,77-80,477 (Confluence upload path: relative-to-absolute conversion, existence check, then open(file path), with no validate safe path call against an upload base directory) and src/mcp atlassian/jira/attachments.py:372-389 (Jira upload path: identical pattern). The boundary is silently dropped: the same containment primitive that defends the download side is not invoked on the upload side.

Reproduction

Observed:
text
CONFLUENCE SINK content id=attacker-visible-page-id filename=mcp-atlassian-poc-secret.txt
CONFLUENCE EXFIL MARKER=FAKE SECRET MARKER DO NOT PUBLISH REAL SECRET
CONFLUENCE RESULT={'success': True, 'filename': 'mcp-atlassian-poc-secret.txt'}
JIRA SINK issue key=ATTACKER-1 filename=mcp-atlassian-poc-secret.txt
JIRA EXFIL MARKER=FAKE SECRET MARKER DO NOT PUBLISH REAL SECRET
JIRA RESULT={'success': True, 'filename': 'mcp-atlassian-poc-secret.txt'}
The PoC uses fake upload sinks and does not contact Atlassian. It demonstrates the vulnerable behavior: a caller-provided absolute server-local path is accepted, read, and delivered to the attachment sink.

Known Issue / Dupe Checks

Known advisories are different:
  • GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4: arbitrary file write through unconstrained Confluence download path.
  • GHSA-7r34-79r5-rcc9: SSRF through unvalidated Atlassian URL headers.
Closest public non-security overlap:
  • issue #618: usability report that upload requires server-side paths.
  • issue #1163: unrelated upload failure on Data Center.
  • PRs #987 / #949: download-path hardening, not upload-source path containment.
No public issue/PR/advisory found for upload-side arbitrary local file read.

Suggested Fix

Add an explicit upload source policy, for example:
  • require MCP ATLASSIAN UPLOAD BASE DIR for server-local upload tools in HTTP/SSE/streamable mode
  • reject absolute paths unless they resolve inside that configured base directory
  • apply validate safe path(path, base dir=upload base dir) before existence checks or reads
  • consider disabling server-local upload tools by default in HTTP mode unless an upload directory is configured
Add regression tests for both Confluence and Jira upload paths:
  • reject /etc/passwd
  • reject ../../../etc/passwd
  • reject symlinks escaping the upload base
  • accept a file inside the configured upload directory
  • verify READ ONLY MODE=true still blocks the write independently

Fix

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Related Identifiers

PYSEC-2026-4098

Affected Products

Mcp-Attlasian