PT-2026-105922 · Pypi · Wlc
Published
2026-10-01
·
Updated
2026-10-01
CVSS v3.1
2.3
Low
| Vector | AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N |
Impact
wlc could send an unscoped API token to an unintended server when run inside a directory tree containing attacker-controlled project configuration.
If
.weblate, .weblate.ini, or weblate.ini defines an API url, and the user supplies a token with WLC KEY or --key without also pinning the URL, wlc would send the token to the project-configured URL.Impacted users are those running wlc in untrusted repositories, pull request checkouts, or directories with untrusted ancestor configuration while using
WLC KEY or --key.Patches
The issue is patched in wlc 2.0.1 via https://github.com/WeblateOrg/wlc/pull/1500.
The fix rejects unscoped keys when the API URL comes from automatically discovered project configuration:
WLC KEYnow requiresWLC URL.--keynow requires--url.- URL-scoped keys in the
[keys]configuration section remain supported.
Users should upgrade to wlc 2.0.1 or newer.
Workarounds
Without upgrading, users can avoid the issue by explicitly pinning the API URL whenever using an unscoped key:
WLC URL=https://hosted.weblate.org/api/ WLC KEY=... wlc ...or:
wlc --url https://hosted.weblate.org/api/ --key ... ...Alternatively, use URL-scoped keys in the [keys] section instead of WLC KEY or --key, and avoid running wlc with secrets in untrusted checkouts.
Fix
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Related Identifiers
Affected Products
Wlc