PT-2026-106641 · Linux · Linux

CVE-2026-98312

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Published

2026-10-06

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Updated

2026-10-06

None

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: 6fire: fix OOB write from device-reported iso length
usb6fire pcm in urb handler() sizes each outgoing isochronous packet as (actual length - 4) / (in n analog << 2) * (out n analog << 2) + 4, where actual length is the unsigned length the device reported for the matching IN packet. A packet completed with status 0 and actual length < 4 wraps the subtraction to 0x7fffffec; a zero-length isochronous packet is legal on the bus, and the preceding loop rejects only non-zero status. The sum reaches memset() on out urb->buffer, a 4832-byte object from kcalloc(PCM MAX PACKET SIZE, PCM N PACKETS PER URB).
Even without the wrap the result is out of bounds: at 88.2/96 kHz the 4-in/6-out scaling turns a full 420-byte IN packet into 628, so eight packets span 5024 bytes of that buffer. usb submit urb() rejects an over-long descriptor only after the memset() and the usb6fire pcm playback() copy of user PCM data have run.
Guard the subtraction as the sibling usb6fire pcm capture() already does, and limit the frame count to what fits in rt->out packet size, the OUT endpoint's wMaxPacketSize. This bounds total length by the buffer size while keeping each packet length aligned to a whole output frame.
BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in usb6fire pcm in urb handler (sound/usb/6fire/pcm.c:338) Write of size 18446744073709551456 at addr ffff88802a3d0000 by task vhci rx/5018 Call Trace: dump stack lvl (lib/dump stack.c:94 lib/dump stack.c:120) print report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:482) kasan report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) kasan check range (mm/kasan/generic.c:186 mm/kasan/generic.c:200) asan memset (mm/kasan/shadow.c:84) usb6fire pcm in urb handler (sound/usb/6fire/pcm.c:338) usb hcd giveback urb (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1657) usb hcd giveback urb (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1741) vhci rx loop (drivers/usb/usbip/vhci rx.c:107 drivers/usb/usbip/vhci rx.c:242) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret from fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) ret from fork asm (arch/x86/entry/entry 64.S:245)
Allocated by task 10: kmalloc cache noprof (mm/slub.c:5563) usb6fire pcm init (sound/usb/6fire/pcm.c:560 sound/usb/6fire/pcm.c:595) usb6fire chip probe (sound/usb/6fire/chip.c:133) usb probe interface (drivers/usb/core/driver.c:399)
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88802a3d0000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8k of size 8192 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of 4832-byte region [ffff88802a3d0000, ffff88802a3d12e0) Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
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Related Identifiers

CVE-2026-98312

Affected Products

Linux