PT-2026-108710 · Pypi · Praisonaiagents
CVE-2026-62169
·
Published
2026-10-08
·
Updated
2026-10-08
CVSS v3.1
8.5
High
| Vector | AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N |
Summary
PraisonAI's
web crawl agent tool performs a server-side HTTP fetch of an agent/attacker-influenced URL. SSRF is meant to be prevented by is safe crawl url(), which resolves the hostname and rejects private/loopback/link-local IPs at validation time. The validated value is the URL string (not a pinned IP); the fetch backend then re-resolves the hostname at connection time. Because validation and connection perform two independent DNS resolutions, a DNS-rebinding domain that returns a public IP during validation and an internal IP during the fetch fully bypasses the guard, and the internal HTTP response body is returned to the caller.This is SSRF with internal response disclosure (read-back) — not blind SSRF. Runtime-confirmed against PraisonAI 4.6.63; the crawl response returned the controlled internal markers
PRAISONAI INTERNAL SECRET CANARY 7f3a91 / FAKE INTERNAL TOKEN DO NOT USE 7f3a91. Severity High. Reachable by any actor who can influence the URL an agent crawls (e.g. a chat/bot/agent surface).Details
Affected component
- Package:
praisonaiagents(PraisonAI), version 4.6.63. - File:
src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/web crawl tools.py; toolweb crawl/crawl web(part of the default bot tool set).
Vulnerable code / root cause
Code point 1 — check-time-only DNS validation, no IP pinning
Path:
src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/web crawl tools.pyFunction:
is safe crawl urlSnippet:
python
for info in socket.getaddrinfo(hostname, None): # resolve at CHECK time
ip = ipaddress.ip address(info[4][0])
if (ip.is loopback or ip.is private or ip.is link local
or ip.is multicast or ip.is unspecified):
return False
return TrueIssue: the guard validates the hostname by resolving it once at check time. It does not pin the resolved IP and does not return/forward that IP to the HTTP client. Any later resolution can differ.
Code point 2 — guard runs, then the URL string is handed to the backend
Function:
web crawlSnippet:
python
for u in raw url list:
if is safe crawl url(u): # validate the URL string
url list.append(u)
...
results = crawl with httpx(url list) # or crawl with crawl4ai(url list)Issue: attacker-controlled input (
urls) is validated as a string; the backend then fetches that string and re-resolves DNS independently of the guard. There is no shared, pinned IP between check and fetch.Code point 3 —
crawl with httpx backend re-resolves (redirect re-validation does not stop rebinding)Function:
crawl with httpxSnippet:
python
with httpx.Client(follow redirects=False, timeout=30.0) as client:
for in range(max redirects + 1):
if not is safe crawl url(current): # re-resolves hostname (CHECK)
raise ValueError("Redirect target failed SSRF validation")
response = client.get(current) # resolves AGAIN at CONNECTIssue: even with per-hop redirect re-validation,
is safe crawl url(current) and client.get(current) are two separate DNS resolutions of the same hostname. A rebinding domain answers public to the check and internal to the connect → TOCTOU bypass. No IP pinning.Code point 4 — urllib fallback (same function), no per-hop guard
Snippet:
python
import urllib.request
with urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=30) as response: # re-resolves + auto-follows redirects
content = response.read().decode('utf-8', errors='ignore')Issue: when
httpx is not installed, this fallback inside crawl with httpx fetches the URL and auto-follows redirects with no per-hop/per-connect validation. (Results from this function are labelled "provider": "httpx" regardless of which path runs.)Code point 5 — crawl4ai/Chromium backend (confirmed addendum)
The crawl4ai backend (
crawl with crawl4ai → crawler.arun(url=url), headless Chromium) is also runtime-confirmed affected (browser re-resolves DNS / follows redirects with no per-connect guard). To keep this report focused on the web crawl SSRF guard, the backend-specific evidence is in SSRF-04 Crawl4AI SSRF Backend Addendum.md.Attack flow
- Attacker controls a hostname (e.g.
rebind.lab) whose authoritative DNS rebinds. - Lookup #1 (the guard) → a public IP →
is safe crawl url()returns true. - The backend re-resolves → the attacker's DNS now answers an internal/private IP (cloud metadata, loopback, internal service).
- The backend connects to the internal service and returns its body to the caller → internal data disclosure.
Why existing protection is bypassed
- The guard validates the hostname, not a pinned IP; check and connect resolve independently → DNS rebinding (TOCTOU) defeats it on every backend.
- Redirect re-validation (httpx path) re-checks the hostname but still re-resolves at connect, so it does not stop rebinding; the urllib fallback and crawl4ai backends have no per-hop guard at all.
Security boundary
The server-side fetch reaches internal/loopback/metadata services not exposed to the attacker and returns their content (CVSS Scope: Changed). Reachable wherever an agent can be induced to crawl an attacker-supplied URL (PR:L). An unauthenticated single-request path to
web crawl read-back was not found in 4.6.63 (so PR:N / Critical is not claimed).Proof of Concept
Environment
Real PraisonAI 4.6.63 in a local Docker runtime; a controlled internal canary service (Docker-internal only, not published) returns synthetic markers; a controlled DNS responder implements rebinding for
rebind.lab. No public host / real metadata / real secret. Runnable assets: PraisonAI-Runtime-Reproruntime-files.Steps to reproduce
- Burp Repeater tab
PRAI-05-01-DNS-Rebind-Trigger→127.0.0.1:18080:
http
POST /tool/web crawl HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:18080
Content-Type: application/json
{"url":"http://rebind.lab:8081/secret"}- Send (
PRAI-05-02-DNS-Rebind-Secret-Readbackcaptures the response). If a send returns the "blocked" error, the rebinding DNS auto-resets (~3s) — resend. - Redirect variant:
PRAI-05-03-Redirect-Trigger/PRAI-05-04-Redirect-Secret-Readbacksend{"url":"http://redirector:8082/redirect-to-internal"}.
Expected result
A safe SSRF guard refuses destinations that resolve to internal/private IPs regardless of DNS timing or redirects, and does not return internal content.
Actual result
HTTP 200 with the internal body in the crawl result. Primary evidence is the
provider: "httpx" backend returning the internal canary via DNS rebinding:json
{"input url":"http://rebind.lab:8081/secret",
"result":{"content":"{ ... "secret": "PRAISONAI INTERNAL SECRET CANARY 7f3a91", "token": "FAKE INTERNAL TOKEN DO NOT USE 7f3a91" ... }","provider":"httpx"}}The redirect variant returns the same internal markers via a redirect chain (
provider: "httpx").Screenshots
DNS rebinding read-back
The attacker-controlled
rebind.lab URL is accepted by web crawl, and the PraisonAI response contains the internal canary response body.DNS rebinding runtime evidence
The runtime log shows
rebind.lab first resolving to an allowed/public IP during validation (guard-pass), then resolving to an internal Docker IP during the actual fetch (fetch-hit). The internal canary receives GET /secret from the PraisonAI container.Redirect-based SSRF read-back
The attacker-controlled redirector URL is accepted by
web crawl. PraisonAI follows the redirect and returns the internal canary response body containing PRAISONAI INTERNAL SECRET CANARY 7f3a91.Redirect chain runtime evidence
The controlled redirector returns
302 -> http://internal-canary:8081/secret, and the internal canary receives GET /secret, confirming that the server-side client followed the redirect into the internal network.Reproduction assets
The attached archive contains the local Docker runtime used to reproduce the issue with controlled canary services only. It does not contain real secrets, real cloud metadata access, or third-party API keys.
Impact
SSRF against internal/loopback/cloud-metadata endpoints with disclosure of internal HTTP responses (read-back) to the attacker. Bypasses the project's SSRF protection on every fetch backend.
Suggested remediation
- Resolve the host once, reject all returned records that are private/loopback/link-local/ULA/CGNAT/metadata, then connect to that exact validated IP (pin it; send the original
Host). Do not let the HTTP client / browser re-resolve. - Apply the same validation + IP pinning to every backend (httpx, urllib fallback, crawl4ai) and every redirect hop.
- Disable automatic redirect following (or cap + re-validate each hop with pinning).
- Treat IPv4-mapped IPv6, decimal/octal/hex IPs, and CGNAT/non-global ranges as unsafe.
Fix
Time Of Check To Time Of Use
SSRF
Information Disclosure
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Related Identifiers
Affected Products
Praisonaiagents