PT-2026-115981 · Pypi · Langflow+3
Published
2026-10-06
·
Updated
2026-10-06
CVSS v4.0
6.3
Medium
| Vector | AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N |
Summary
Before Langflow 1.10.3, several built-in components sent server-side HTTP requests to URLs the flow author controls, with no SSRF enforcement. An authenticated user who can build or run flows could make the Langflow server reach loopback, RFC 1918 / private networks, link-local addresses and cloud metadata endpoints (for example
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/), and in many cases read the response back through the component output.Two things combined to cause this:
- Protection disabled / warn-only. The SSRF guard (
lfx/utils/ssrf protection.py, added in 1.7.0 by #10544) shipped withssrf protection enabled = False, and its only caller, the API Request component, calledvalidate url for ssrf(url, warn only=True). So even with protection turned on, blocked URLs were only logged. - Inconsistent coverage. Other components that take a user-supplied URL or base URL did not call the guard at all: RSS Reader, SearXNG, Web Search (fetching result / RSS URLs), Home Assistant, Glean Search and Docling Serve (remote).
The problem was fixed across several PRs and is fully fixed in Langflow 1.10.3 (and 1.11.0+). With the default settings, outbound requests from these components are now validated after DNS resolution, pinned to the validated IP (to prevent DNS rebinding) and blocked when they target private, loopback, link-local or metadata addresses, unless the operator allowlists the host.
Affected versions
| Package (PyPI) | Vulnerable | Patched |
|---|---|---|
langflow | < 1.10.3 | 1.10.3 |
langflow-base | < 0.10.3 | 0.10.3 |
lfx | < 1.10.3 | 1.10.3 |
lfx-docling (Docling Serve component) | < 0.1.2 | 0.1.2 |
How the fix rolled out:
| Release | Change |
|---|---|
< 1.7.0 | No SSRF guard. All URL-taking components make unrestricted requests. |
1.7.0 – 1.9.2 | Guard exists, but ssrf protection enabled=False by default and API Request uses warn only=True. |
1.9.3 | #13016: protection on by default, API Request blocks (DNS pinning / anti-rebinding). Other components still unprotected. |
1.10.1 | #13395 (RSS Reader, SearXNG) and #13643 (Home Assistant, Glean, plus model-provider URL components) route requests through SSRF-safe helpers. |
1.10.3 | #14033 (Docling Serve) and #14071 (Web Search result/RSS fetching). All components cited in this report are protected. |
Details
Vulnerable pattern (for example
rss.py before #13395):python
response = requests.get(self.rss url, timeout=self.timeout)API Request before #13016:
python
# TODO: In next major version (2.0), remove warn only=True to enforce blocking
validate url for ssrf(url, warn only=True)with
ssrf protection enabled: bool = False in the settings.Clarifications on the original report. Some sinks in the report are not exploitable SSRF:
web search.py: the DuckDuckGo search request and the Google News RSS request, andnews search.py:131. The host is hard-coded (html.duckduckgo.com/news.google.com) and user input only goes intoquote plus-encoded path and query segments, so the destination cannot be redirected. The real Web Search sink was fetching the result URLs, which is fixed in #14071.langflow/load/utils.pyget flow(): this is a client-side SDK helper (from langflow.load import get flow) that the caller runs against their own Langflow URL. No API route calls it, so it is not a backend SSRF endpoint.
PoC (vulnerable versions)
- Log in as any user who can create flows.
- Add an RSS Reader (or SearXNG / Home Assistant / Glean / Docling Serve) component and set its URL to
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/(or an internal host such ashttp://10.0.0.1/). - Run the component. The Langflow server issues the request, and the response or error is shown in the component output.
On patched versions the same run fails with
SSRFProtectionError: Access to IP address 169.254.169.254 is blocked by SSRF protection.Impact
- Access to cloud instance metadata (IAM credentials / tokens) on AWS, GCP and Azure deployments.
- Probing and interaction with internal services and private networks reachable from the Langflow host.
- Requires an authenticated account with permission to build or run flows. Deployments where every user is already fully trusted are less affected.
Fix
- #13016: sets
ssrf protection enabled = Trueby default, changeswarn onlyto defaultFalse, dropswarn only=Truefrom API Request, and addsvalidate and resolve url()plusSSRFProtectedTransport(DNS pinning).
diff
- ssrf protection enabled: bool = False
+ ssrf protection enabled: bool = True- #13395: adds
lfx.utils.ssrf requests.ssrf safe get(per-hop validation and pinning forrequests) and uses it in RSS Reader and SearXNG.
diff
- response = requests.get(self.rss url, timeout=self.timeout)
+ response = ssrf safe get(self.rss url, timeout=self.timeout)- #13643: adds
lfx.utils.ssrf httpx(ssrf safe httpx get/post, protected client kwargs) and applies it to Home Assistant, Glean and the model-provider base-URL components. - #14033: Docling Serve builds its
httpx.Clientwithssrf protected httpx client kwargs for url(base url). - #14071 (release-1.10.3) / #14073 (forward-port to 1.11.0): Web Search validates and pins each result URL before fetching it, with redirects disabled.
Note: connector-style components (for example Home Assistant, Ollama, LM Studio) keep a documented loopback exemption (#14146), so a self-hosted user can reach a local service on
localhost. Private-network and metadata addresses stay blocked. Operators can tighten or relax this with LANGFLOW SSRF ALLOWED HOSTS and LANGFLOW CONNECTOR SSRF VALIDATION ENABLED.Remediation
- Upgrade to
langflow >= 1.10.3(orlangflow-base >= 0.10.3/lfx >= 1.10.3/lfx-docling >= 0.1.2). - Do not set
LANGFLOW SSRF PROTECTION ENABLED=false. If you need to reach internal hosts on purpose, allowlist only those hosts withLANGFLOW SSRF ALLOWED HOSTS. - On versions that cannot be upgraded right away, restrict outbound network access from the Langflow host (for example, block
169.254.169.254and use IMDSv2 on AWS).
Fix
SSRF
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Weakness Enumeration
Related Identifiers
Affected Products
Langflow
Langflow-Base
Lfx
Lfx-Docling