PT-2026-120318 · Maven · Org.A2Aproject.Sdk:A2A-Java-Sdk-Server-Common

Published

2026-10-20

·

Updated

2026-10-20

CVSS v3.1

5.8

Medium

VectorAV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N
  • Ecosystem: Maven
  • Affected package: org.a2aproject.sdk:a2a-java-sdk-server-common (push-notification delivery)
  • Affected versions: <= 1.2.0.Final (and 1.2.1.Final-SNAPSHOT on main prior to the fix)
  • Patched version: (the release that carries the fix)
  • CWE: CWE-918 (Server-Side Request Forgery)
  • Severity: High
  • CVSS v3.1: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N (5.8, Moderate)

Summary

An unauthenticated attacker can coerce the a2a-java server into issuing HTTP requests to arbitrary internal and cloud-metadata endpoints from the server's own network position — a Server-Side Request Forgery reachable in the default deployment with no credentials, no user interaction, and a single request. The behaviour is the shipped default, not a misconfiguration.

Details

BasePushNotificationSender (in server-common) POSTs task data to the URL stored on a task's TaskPushNotificationConfig with no validation of the destination: no block on loopback, RFC1918, link-local (169.254.0.0/16, including the 169.254.169.254 metadata address), unique-local, unspecified, or multicast ranges; no scheme restriction; and no bound on redirects. InMemoryPushNotificationConfigStore.setInfo stores the URL verbatim and onCreateTaskPushNotificationConfig does not check it either.
Both shipped HTTP clients follow redirects (JdkA2AHttpClient → followRedirects(NORMAL), VertxA2AHttpClient → setFollowRedirects(true)), so a creation-time URL allowlist is bypassable: an attacker webhook answers 302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/... and the client follows it. A hostname check is likewise defeated by DNS rebinding. A correct guard must validate the resolved IP of every hop at connection time, not the URL string.

Exploitation

Demonstrated end-to-end against a running server (default wiring, unauthenticated caller):
  • Arbitrary internal reachability. The attacker picks the destination and the server issues the request from inside the trust boundary. Delivery to loopback and to a real RFC1918 LAN address was exercised at runtime; because the code applies no destination filtering of any kind, the same path reaches link-local / metadata (169.254.169.254) and other internal ranges wherever network routing permits.
  • Allowlist + method bypass via redirect. A 302 from the attacker's webhook reaches destinations a creation-time allowlist would block, and a 302 on a POST is followed as a GET — so GET-only endpoints such as the IMDS credentials path are reachable even though the sender only issues POSTs. This is why a URL allowlist is not a sufficient fix; the guard must validate the resolved IP of every redirect hop.
  • Data push into internal services. On direct (non-redirected) delivery, each request carries the task payload in the body, so internal services that ingest POST data receive attacker-influenced content (basis for I:L). On a redirected request the body is dropped in the POST→GET conversion, so the body-push and the redirect-reach are separate capabilities, not simultaneous on one request.
The sender discards the fetched response and exposes no caller-visible difference between a successful and a failed delivery (both paths return without surfacing status or body), so the base case reads back nothing — confidentiality is scored C:N. Read-back is limited, reach is not: the attacker still drives fully controlled requests to metadata and internal services and writes data into them.

PoC

Against a running server with push notifications enabled (JSON-RPC transport), using only the real production classes wired the default way:
  1. Start a local listener standing in for an internal target (no real metadata service is touched).
  2. Send one SendMessage that starts a long-running task, with the push config inlined and its url set to http://<internal-target>/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/. Use returnImmediately: true, header A2A-Version: 1.0, and role ROLE USER. The URL is stored verbatim. (Equivalent via CreateTaskPushNotificationConfig on an existing task.)
  3. As the task emits state/artifact updates, the sender POSTs each one to the stored URL, from the server's own network position:
POST /latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ HTTP/1.1
Host: 169.254.169.254
Content-Type: application/json

{"artifactUpdate":{"taskId":"...","artifact":{"parts":[{"text":"Progress update 1/20"}]}, ...}}
One SendMessage produced multiple server-side POSTs to the attacker-chosen internal path. Verified on main (commit 72d220c, JDK 21) and unchanged on 1.2.0.Final.

Remediation

Validate the resolved IP of the target and of every redirect hop before connecting: reject loopback / RFC1918 / link-local / metadata / unique-local / unspecified / multicast; restrict the scheme to http/https; cap redirects; and resolve-and-pin to defeat DNS rebinding. Enable by default, with a documented opt-out for deployments that intentionally target internal webhooks. The Go A2A SDK ships a dial-time resolved-IP guard of this shape by default.
Workaround: until a fixed release, block the host's outbound egress to the metadata endpoint and internal ranges at the network layer.

References

Fix

SSRF

Found an issue in the description? Have something to add? Feel free to write us 👾
dbugs@ptsecurity.com

Weakness Enumeration

CWE-918

Related Identifiers

GHSA-Q78C-5JJQ-57G8

Affected Products

Org.A2Aproject.Sdk:A2A-Java-Sdk-Server-Common