In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

usb: gadget: f uac1 legacy: validate bRequest index in generic {set,get} cmd

generic set cmd() and generic get cmd() use the low nibble of ctrl->bRequest as an index into con->data[]:

u8 cmd = (ctrl->bRequest & 0x0F); /* 0 .. 15 / ... con->data[cmd] = value; / OOB when cmd >= 5 */

struct usb audio control (include/linux/usb/audio.h) declares data as a 5-element array, so indices 5 through 15 write (or read) up to 44 bytes past the end of the array on the heap.

A malicious USB host can craft a class-specific SET CUR / GET CUR request with an arbitrary bRequest value, triggering the out-of-bounds access from an IRQ completion handler with no further preconditions.

Add an ARRAY SIZE() guard to both functions.