PT-2026-133524
CVE-2026-118988
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Published
2026-10-30
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Updated
2026-10-30
Description by
Score
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CallBackery versions before 0.60.1 for Perl let unauthenticated clients read the POD of any file via path traversal in the /doc route.
Every CallBackery application mounts its documentation plugin at /doc, ahead of any session check. The route passes the requested name to Pod::Simple::Search->find without validation. find splits the name on "::" and joins the parts into a file path, so a name such as "..::..::..::etc::motd" escapes @INC.
Any file the server process can read is reachable. Only POD is rendered, but a file with a POD directive and no "=cut" is POD to the end of the file.
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