PT-2026-151516
CVE-2026-99335
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Published
2026-11-19
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Updated
2026-11-19
Description by
Score
N/A
Not availableNo severity ratings or metrics are available. When they are, we'll update the corresponding info on the page.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: guest memfd: Establish memslot<=>guest memfd bindings after memslot is ready
Wait to bind a memslot to a guest memfd instance until after the memslot
is fully prepared, as creating the binding in guest memfd will effectively
expose the memslot to readers. As pointed out by Sashiko, binding the
memslot before it's ready to be exposed to the rest of the world can break
various memslot assumption and rules. E.g. x86 could observe a NULL rmap
pointer if a PUNCH HOLE hit the guest memfd after the binding was created,
but before KVM made it through kvm prepare memory region().
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