PT-2026-151538

CVE-2026-99357

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Published

2026-11-19

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Updated

2026-11-19

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: Copy the deferred RPC Call from the head buffer
svc defer() snapshots the RPC Call for replay once a pending cache upcall resolves. It copies the Call starting (rq arg.len - head[0].iov len) bytes before head[0].iov base, a back-up that once covered a transport header. No transport has had one since commit 983084b2672c ("SUNRPC: Remove svc rqst::rq xprt hlen"), so the two lengths are meant to be equal.
An RPCSEC GSS Call breaks that assumption. Unwrapping the integrity service truncates rq arg.len by the length of the trailing checksum, and unwrapping the privacy service leaves rq arg.len short by an amount the client sets with trailing bytes after the wrap token. Neither adjusts head[0].iov len. Both lengths are size t, so the subtraction underflows and the copy starts past head[0].iov base. Every deferred integrity Call replays a shifted snapshot.
A deferred replay skips GSS verification, so a shifted snapshot runs as an authenticated Call. With the privacy service the offset is client-chosen. A forged Call placed in that window, naming another user's GSS context handle, runs under that identity.
Copy the Call from head[0].iov base. Refuse to defer a Call whose length runs past the head buffer, so the copy cannot read out of bounds.
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