PT-2026-151556

CVE-2026-99375

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Published

2026-11-19

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Updated

2026-11-19

Description by

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSv4/flexfiles: fail I/O to the data server once a lock is lost
When a client loses a byte-range lock, because its lease expired and it may not recover the lock (nfs.recover lost locks=0) or because reclaim failed, it marks the lock state NFS LOCK LOST and fails further I/O by that lock owner. Otherwise an application that believes it holds a lock over a range is never told that the lock is gone, and can overwrite data that another client has since written under its own lock on that range.
The NFSv4 READ/WRITE and file layout I/O paths apply this in rpc call prepare, where nfs4 set rw stateid() returns -EIO for a lost lock. The flexfiles data server I/O path does not: the NFSv3 data server path never checked, and the check on the NFSv4 path was removed when the data server stateid began to be taken from the layout.
Fail read and write RPCs to the data server in rpc call prepare when the lock is lost. The data server path has no use for the stateid that nfs4 set rw stateid() selects, and selecting it looks up a delegation or open stateid on every I/O. Instead add nfs4 lock context lost(), which only tests NFS LOCK LOST, and check it alongside the open state. Its lookup, nfs4 lookup lock state(), is split out of nfs4 find lock state() and takes no reference: a lock state is only unlinked from state->lock states under state->state lock, so one found while holding that lock cannot be freed before it is released. Use it in nfs4 copy lock stateid() as well, which only reads the lock state under that lock. That drops a reference get and put from stateid selection for all NFSv4 I/O without changing the stateid selected.
Terminating the RPC in rpc call prepare is not enough on its own. The done callback reads the -EIO as a data server connection error, forgets the device ID, and resets the I/O to pNFS (or, for an NFSv4 data server, possibly to the MDS). After a reset to pNFS a new LAYOUTGET is granted and rpc call prepare fails the I/O again, without end. The existing NFS CONTEXT BAD check does not loop, since the open state is then invalid and pnfs update layout() fails the reset I/O, but it still forgets the device ID.
So when an RPC that was never sent fails and the open context is bad, the open state is invalid, or the lock is lost, complete it with -EIO without error handling. An RPC that was sent and failed is handled as before, so a real data server error is still reported to the MDS.
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