PT-2026-151566
CVE-2026-99385
·
Published
2026-11-19
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Updated
2026-11-19
Description by
Score
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix buffer overflow in SMB2 tcon()
In SMB2 tcon(), unc path is allocated with a fixed buffer size of
MAX SHARENAME LENGTH * 2 bytes (672 bytes). However, the user-controlled
UNC path (tree) length is passed to cifs strtoUTF16(), which assumes the
destination buffer is large enough and writes strlen(tree) + 1 UTF-16 code
units.
Commit 62a1a439e0fd ("cifs: clean up handling of unc= option") removed the
length check on UNC mount options, allowing mount paths to exceed
MAX SHARENAME LENGTH while retaining the fixed-size buffer allocation in
SMB2 tcon(). Consequently, an oversized UNC string causes cifs strtoUTF16()
to write past the end of the heap object, resulting in a slab-out-of-bounds
write. Furthermore, if a tree exceeds MAX TREE SIZE characters, strscpy()
truncates it in cifs tcon::tree name, causing subsequent reconnects or
failovers to fail.
Fix this by first verifying that the length of tree does not exceed
MAX TREE SIZE, returning -EINVAL if it does. Then, dynamically allocate
unc path based on the length of tree so that it safely accommodates all
UTF-16 code units for paths within MAX TREE SIZE.
[pc: remove unused MAX SHARENAME LENGTH]
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