PT-2026-151576
CVE-2026-99395
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Published
2026-11-19
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Updated
2026-11-19
Description by
Score
N/A
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: bound inode fork length against the fork size during log recovery
xlog recover inode commit pass2() copies an inode log item's data/attr
fork region into the inode buffer using the on-log region length without
bounding it against the fork capacity, e.g.:
len = item->ri buf[2].iov len;
memcpy(XFS DFORK DPTR(dip), src, len);The only guard is an ASSERT, which is a no-op on production kernels
(CONFIG XFS DEBUG off), and xfs dinode verify() runs only after the copy.
A crafted image with a dirty log can therefore drive a heap out-of-bounds
write at mount time. The XFS ILOG DBROOT sibling already passes
XFS DFORK DSIZE as a bound; the DDATA/DEXT and ADATA/AEXT memcpy paths
did not.
Bound each logged fork region against the destination fork size before
copying it, and reject the log item with -EFSCORRUPTED when it does not
fit. Because the recovered inode is only verified after the fork data has
been copied in, the checks are done up front, before any memcpy into the
on-disk inode.
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