PT-2026-151665
CVE-2026-99454
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Published
2026-11-19
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Updated
2026-11-19
Description by
Score
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix protected RX frame validation in decrypt path
The RX software decrypt path mishandles crafted protected frames from a
malicious AP in two ways:
-
decryptor() never checks that a protected frame is long enough to hold the 802.11 header plus the per-cipher trailer. All of rtw wep decrypt(), rtw tkip decrypt() and rtw aes decrypt() computelength = hdr.len - hdrlen - iv len;
and act on the result, and recvframe chkmic() similarly computes
datalen = hdr.len - hdrlen - iv len - icv len - 8;for TKIP (the 8-byte Michael MIC is not accounted for in icv len).
A frame shorter than hdrlen + iv len + icv len (+ 8 for TKIP) underflows
these unsigned subtractions, turning into a ~4 GiB iteration count in
aes decipher()/arc4 crypt()/rtw seccalctkipmic() or a ~4 GiB crc32 le()
length, causing out-of-bounds reads/writes of up to ~4 GiB starting from
the rx skb. Reject such frames in decryptor() before touching the IV;
this covers all three ciphers and the TKIP MIC check, and also keeps the
unconditional iv[3] access within the frame.
- validate 80211w mgmt() keeps using the frame - two memcpys through the stale rx data pointer and a pkt len update - before checking whether decryptor() returned NULL. On decrypt failure (e.g. a unicast protected deauth/disassoc/action frame with a bad MIC, which this path always software-decrypts) the skb has already been freed, so this is a use-after-free read/write, and the caller's error path frees the frame a second time, drifting free recvframe cnt. Bail out immediately when decryptor() fails, freeing the temporary mgmt DATA buffer first.
Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.
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