PT-2026-151747
CVE-2026-99536
·
Published
2026-11-19
·
Updated
2026-11-19
Description by
Score
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: prevent session binding in compound requests
A failed multichannel binding can retain its target session on the work
item so that the error response can be signed. Subsequent compound
commands can then use that session together with a tree connection left
over from an earlier command.
Limit binding SESSION SETUP requests to standalone messages during
message validation, before smb2 sess setup() can replace work->sess.
Check both NextCommand and the current request offset to cover binding
in the first, middle and last positions of a compound. The existing
validation error path returns STATUS INVALID PARAMETER and stops
processing the remaining commands.
This intentionally limits support for compounded binding. It is not a
protocol requirement that binding be standalone. Standalone binding and
non-binding compounds retain their existing behavior, without changing
session, tree or response encryption handling.
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