PT-2026-151761

CVE-2026-99550

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Published

2026-11-19

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Updated

2026-11-19

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: pin owning modules for open debugfs files
The OCFS2 debugfs file operation tables do not set owner. The full debugfs proxy obtains real fops with fops get() at open and keeps it until final release. Without an owner, this does not acquire a reference to the module containing the table and its callbacks. Removing the debugfs entries does not drain retained open files.
An open connected nodes file can therefore outlive ocfs2 nodemanager and make full proxy release() read real fops->release from freed module memory. Heming also reproduced the issue with fs state and asked for the other OCFS2 debugfs operation tables to be checked.
Set owner to THIS MODULE in all eleven explicit debugfs operation tables: five in ocfs2 nodemanager, four in ocfs2 dlm, and two in ocfs2. The existing debugfs get/put pair then holds the appropriate module until final release. Leave the open, read and release callbacks unchanged. The blockcheck table already sets owner through DEFINE DEBUGFS ATTRIBUTE(), so it needs no change.
The original controlled test used an unloadable OCFS2 module and case-local probe filters without changing the candidate open, unload or release logic. Closing a retained connected nodes file after normal unload produced:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff804cfef Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI RIP: 0010:full proxy release+0xbf/0x190 Call Trace: fput+0x39a/0xa60 fput close sync+0xff/0x200 x64 sys close+0x8c/0xf0 do syscall 64+0x114/0x620 entry SYSCALL 64 after hwframe+0x77/0x7f Modules linked in: [last unloaded: ocfs2 nodemanager]
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