PT-2026-152451

CVE-2026-99571

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Published

2026-11-20

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Updated

2026-11-20

Description by

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-tcp: Validate the queue state under the queue lock in the address attribute
Reading the "address" sysfs attribute calls kernel getsockname() on the admin queue socket, which can race with the queue teardown during connection error recovery: a reader can observe NVME TCP Q LIVE set, then block on the queue lock while nvme tcp free queue() releases the socket and clears queue->sock without holding the lock. Once the reader acquires the lock it dereferences the NULL socket pointer.
Commit 76d54bf20cdc ("nvme-tcp: don't access released socket during error recovery") had the queue liveness check inside the lock. Commit 782373ba2766 ("nvme: tcp: avoid race between queue lock lock and destroy") moved it back out because the lock itself is destroyed in nvme tcp free queue(), so a reader arriving late trips mutex destroy().
Check the queue liveness inside the queue lock, and clear queue->sock under the same lock. The teardown clears NVME TCP Q LIVE under the lock well before the socket is released, so a reader either sees the bit cleared or a socket that cannot be released while it holds the lock. To also close the lock lifetime race, the queue locks are now owned by the controller: they are initialized with the queue array and only destroyed when the controller is freed, which cannot happen while a sysfs attribute read is still in progress. The queue count is computed by the NVME TCP OPT NR QUEUES() macro from the original connect options for both initialization and destruction, as reconnects may shrink ctrl->queue count.
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