PT-2026-152515
CVE-2026-99635
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Published
2026-11-20
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Updated
2026-11-20
Description by
Score
N/A
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vhost/vsock: size receive SKBs from declared payload
vhost vsock alloc skb() sizes the skb from iov length(), the total guest
descriptor length. virtio transport inc rx pkt() instead adds hdr->len to
rx bytes and buf used, and budgets each queued skb as SKB TRUESIZE(0). The
guest controls the descriptor length and hdr->len independently.
A guest can therefore provide a 64 KiB descriptor while declaring a zero
payload. The descriptor-sized skb remains queued, rx bytes and buf used
remain unchanged, and only the fixed queue-entry budget limits retention.
This is not a lifetime leak: the skb is freed when dequeued or at socket
teardown. Repeating this across connections can nevertheless exhaust host
memory. On Linux v7.2, 455 such descriptors retained 30,255,680 bytes for
a 262,144-byte receive buffer; a full-payload control retained 265,984
bytes.
Vhost previously read hdr->len and allocated pkt->buf from that value. The
conversion from virtio vsock pkt to sk buff instead allocated receive skbs
from the descriptor length, introducing the allocation-accounting mismatch.
Copy the header into a stack object and validate hdr->len before allocating
the skb. Size the allocation as sizeof(hdr) + payload len so descriptor
capacity no longer determines queued memory. Check payload len against
len - sizeof(hdr) to avoid addition overflow on 32-bit hosts.
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