PT-2026-152599
CVE-2026-99719
·
Published
2026-11-20
·
Updated
2026-11-20
Description by
Score
N/A
Not availableNo severity ratings or metrics are available. When they are, we'll update the corresponding info on the page.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (lm87) Fix drvdata type confusion in vrm show() and vrm store()
When an LM87 or ADM1024 device is probed with VID support enabled, reading
from or writing to the vrm sysfs attribute triggers a driver data type
confusion in vrm show() and vrm store() in drivers/hwmon/lm87.c.
In lm87 probe(), the driver stores the struct lm87 data pointer on the I2C
client via i2c set clientdata() and passes the struct i2c client pointer as
the drvdata argument to devm hwmon device register with groups(), which
attaches the attribute groups to the registered hwmon device with client as
its driver data. Unlike the other sysfs callbacks that retrieve client via
dev get drvdata() and then obtain data via i2c get clientdata(), vrm show()
and vrm store() assign dev get drvdata(dev) directly to struct lm87 data *.
Dereferencing data->vrm therefore accesses the struct i2c client instance
at offsetof(struct lm87 data, vrm), causing vrm show() to leak an unrelated
byte from struct i2c client to userspace and vrm store() to corrupt a byte
within struct i2c client while failing to update the actual VRM value.
Fix the problem by assigning the return value from dev get drvdata(dev) to
struct i2c client *client and using i2c get clientdata() to get the actual
client data.
Found an issue in the description? Have something to add? Feel free to write us 👾