PT-2026-152614
CVE-2026-99734
·
Published
2026-11-20
·
Updated
2026-11-20
Description by
Score
N/A
Not availableNo severity ratings or metrics are available. When they are, we'll update the corresponding info on the page.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/shmem: make shmem file() check the file's inode
shmem file() only checks if file->f mapping is a shmem mapping. This
mapping can belong to another file, however, as with a Coda file backed
by a tmpfs container after mmap().
So it does not guarantee that the file inode is an actual shmem inode.
Seal handling and memfd preservation use this check before accessing
shmem inode state, so they can access an inode of the wrong type.
Let's make shmem file() check the inode's file operations instead, to
identify shmem inodes reliably. This will identify regular shmem inodes,
including memfds and ordinary tmpfs files, independently of wrapper file
operations.
Use shmem mapping() in collapse file() instead to not change the behavior
of collapse file(): it operates on the page cache and uses mapping->host
for shmem inode operations. Focusing on the file does not seem relevant.
Found an issue in the description? Have something to add? Feel free to write us 👾