PT-2026-152650
CVE-2026-99771
·
Published
2026-11-20
·
Updated
2026-11-20
Description by
Score
N/A
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: reload TDLS header pointer after skb linearize()
ieee80211 process tdls channel switch() sets tf = skb->data before it
calls skb linearize(), and reads tf->action code afterwards.
ieee80211 rx h data() queues TDLS channel switch requests and
responses to the interface after pulling only
offsetof(struct ieee80211 tdls data, u) bytes, so the skb can still be
non-linear when the interface work handles it. Drivers that build
paged RX skbs do this for every frame that does not fit into the skb
head, e.g. iwlwifi (mvm), which is also the only mac80211 driver
that sets NL80211 FEATURE TDLS CHANNEL SWITCH. If the remaining data
does not fit into the tailroom, skb linearize() moves the data to a
new head and frees the old one, and the action code is then read from
freed memory. Depending on what that memory holds by then, the frame
is handled as before or ends in the WARN ON ONCE() of the default
case.
The frame only has to be a data frame with the TDLS ethertype from an
authorized peer, e.g. relayed by the AP from another station in the
BSS; the read happens before the sender is checked to be a TDLS peer.
Load tf after skb linearize(), as the request and response handlers
already do.
Found by static analysis tool CodeQL.
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