PT-2026-152650

CVE-2026-99771

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Published

2026-11-20

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Updated

2026-11-20

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: reload TDLS header pointer after skb linearize()
ieee80211 process tdls channel switch() sets tf = skb->data before it calls skb linearize(), and reads tf->action code afterwards.
ieee80211 rx h data() queues TDLS channel switch requests and responses to the interface after pulling only offsetof(struct ieee80211 tdls data, u) bytes, so the skb can still be non-linear when the interface work handles it. Drivers that build paged RX skbs do this for every frame that does not fit into the skb head, e.g. iwlwifi (mvm), which is also the only mac80211 driver that sets NL80211 FEATURE TDLS CHANNEL SWITCH. If the remaining data does not fit into the tailroom, skb linearize() moves the data to a new head and frees the old one, and the action code is then read from freed memory. Depending on what that memory holds by then, the frame is handled as before or ends in the WARN ON ONCE() of the default case.
The frame only has to be a data frame with the TDLS ethertype from an authorized peer, e.g. relayed by the AP from another station in the BSS; the read happens before the sender is checked to be a TDLS peer.
Load tf after skb linearize(), as the request and response handlers already do.
Found by static analysis tool CodeQL.
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