PT-2026-48480 · Npm+2 · @Papra/Webhooks+1
CVE-2026-48051
·
Published
2026-06-10
·
Updated
2026-07-27
CVSS v3.1
3.5
Low
| Vector | AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N |
Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions
Papra versions prior to 26.5.0
Description
The webhook delivery system contains a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) protection bypass. While the system validates the registered webhook URL against a blocklist of internal addresses (including loopback, link-local, and RFC-1918 ranges), it fails to validate redirect destinations. The HTTP client
ofetch automatically follows 3xx responses, allowing an authenticated organization member to register a webhook pointing to an attacker-controlled server that redirects the request to any internal address.Technical details include:
- Vulnerable Function:
ofetch.raw()inpackages/webhooks/src/webhooks.services.tsis called without aredirectoption, defaulting tofollow. - Bypass Mechanism: The SSRF checks
checkWebhookUrlIsSsrfSafeandfilterOutSsrfUnsafeWebhooksonly validate the initial URL and not theLocationheader of a redirect response.
This is a blind SSRF, meaning response bodies are not exposed via the API, but internal network topology can be inferred based on request success or failure. Additionally, HTTP 307 redirects can be used to send state-changing POST requests to internal services.
Recommendations
Update to version 26.5.0.
As a temporary mitigation, restrict the use of the webhook delivery system for untrusted organization members.
Exploit
Fix
SSRF
Found an issue in the description? Have something to add? Feel free to write us 👾
Weakness Enumeration
Related Identifiers
Affected Products
@Papra/Webhooks
Papra