Anyquery's server mode lacks input sanitization and access control over its built-in SQLite virtual table modules (e.g., csv reader, log reader). Unauthenticated attackers connecting to the MySQL-compatible server port can create virtual tables pointing to local files on the system (e.g., /etc/passwd, ~/.ssh/id rsa). This allows full Local File Read (LFR) capabilities, compromising sensitive system configurations and credentials.

Anyquery utilizes the hashicorp/go-getter library within its data ingestion modules. When Anyquery is launched in Server Mode (anyquery server), it binds to a TCP port and accepts MySQL protocol connections. The server handler does not restrict the usage of these virtual table modules to safe directories. An attacker can connect to the server and execute native SQLite virtual table creation queries to instantiate modules like csv reader pointing to restricted files. Because the file read operation is initiated by the Anyquery server process, the attacker can read any file the process has access to.

anyquery server --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8070

mysql -u root -h <VICTIM IP> -P 8070

CREATE VIRTUAL TABLE passwd USING csv reader('/etc/passwd');
SELECT * FROM passwd;

Implement a sandboxing mechanism in Server Mode (e.g., a --restrict-paths flag) to limit read * operations to designated directories.