There is a blind server side request forgery in the functionality that allows editing an image via a prompt. The affected function will perform a GET request on the URL provided by the user. There is no restriction on the domain of the provided URL allowing the local address space to be interacted with. Since the SSRF is blind (the response cannot be read) impact is port scanning of the local network because it can be confirmed if the port is open based on if the GET request failed.

The vulnerability occurs here: https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/2b26355002064228e9b671339f8f3fb9d1fafa73/backend/open webui/routers/images.py#L850-L916 Line 911 shows the user provided URL passed to the function load url image. Within this function on line 883 HTTP/HTTPs URLs are trusted blindly and called asynchronously with requests.get.

The vulnerability can be reproduced with the following curl command:

curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/v1/images/edit 
 -H "Authorization: Bearer <token>" 
 -H "Content-Type: application/json" 
 -d '{"form data":{
  "image": "<url>",
  "prompt": "poc"}
 }'

Response differentials can be used to port scan the local network: This can be automated to iterate through the entire port range to determine open ports. If the service running on an open port can be inferred the user may be able to interact with it in a meaningful way if the service offers any state changing GET request endpoints.

Restrict provided URLs from local address space.